



A FRAGILITY THEORY OF TRADEMARK FUNCTIONALITY 
MATTHEW G. SIPE† 
According to functionality doctrine, trademark protection cannot be granted for 
any feature that is essential to a product’s use or purpose, or that affects the product’s 
cost or quality. But because of the placebo effect, even seemingly inert names and 
symbols are imbued with precisely this kind of power. In fact, a wide variety of real-
world phenomena challenge the prevailing understanding of trademark functionality, 
from the social uses of high-fashion marks to the cost reductions enabled by 
certification marks. More fundamentally, a valuable trademark of any kind should 
act to reduce search costs for consumers and improve quality through reputation. And 
yet, rather than leading to invalidation, all of these well-documented functionalities 
are apparently tolerated by trademark law—sometimes merely ignored, but often 
celebrated explicitly. 
This Article proposes a more unified theory of functionality: fragility. Some 
product features affect cost, quality, use, and purpose in ways that are non-fragile—
the effects would persist even if every producer were to copy the same feature. But 
some features affect the product in ways that are fragile—the effects would be 
degraded or broken through unchecked copying. In reality, only non-fragile 
functionalities are actually prohibited, whereas fragile functionalities are permitted 
and even encouraged. In a manner surprisingly similar to patent or copyright law, 
trademark law appears to carefully distinguish between improvements that require 
its protection in order to manifest, and those that do not. 
This fragility theory not only better explains real-world case outcomes and the 
functionality doctrine’s full history, but also offers a conceptual improvement that can 
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be applied to all types of trademarks. A generic term, for example, exhibits non-fragile 
linguistic functionality. Moreover, fragility theory provides consistent answers to 
divisive boundary issues in trademark law, such as overlapping protection under 
copyright, anti-dilution rights, and post-sale confusion doctrine. At the same time, 
recognizing this fragility pattern calls attention to potentially adverse consequences in 
terms of distributive justice and market competition—consequences that trademark 
law itself may not be able to remedy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A set of test subjects are randomly assigned to one of two treatment 
groups for their frequent headaches: generic or brand-name ibuprofen 
(Nurofen®). They are provided with multiple doses and instructed to take 
one for each of their headaches over the next few weeks, rating their pain 
relief and any side effects each time. In reality, for both groups, only half of 
the doses contain actual ibuprofen; the other half are covert placebos. 
Unsurprisingly, the generic-label placebo doses do not perform nearly as well 
as the generic-label doses with real active ingredients. The Nurofen-label 
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doses, however, exhibit no such difference. That is, whether they take a 
Nurofen-labeled placebo or the real thing, subjects report similarly high levels 
of pain relief and low incidence of side effects. Thus, as if by magic, a simple 
sugar pill with a trademark manages to perform just as well as the genuine, 
but generic-label, pharmaceutical.1 
Experiments performed with other medications yield similar outcomes. 
Subjects given trademark-branded anti–anxiety drugs, for example, present 
with lower blood pressure and less severe side effects than those given 
identical generics.2 But the phenomenon is not limited to medicine. From 
athletic equipment3 and test-taking materials4 to powdered drink mix5 and 
deli meat,6 otherwise identical products perform better when they are 
endowed with trademarked names, symbols, and designs. Through a variation 
of the placebo effect, human psychology transforms these seemingly inert 
names and logos into measurable product enhancements. 
Fundamental trademark doctrine clashes with this scientific reality. It is a 
“well-established rule” that trademark protection is not available for 
functional product features.7 And, as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, 
“a product feature is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of 
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”8 The rationale for 
this functionality doctrine is fairly straightforward: trademarks (unlike 
 
1 Kate Faasse, Leslie R. Martin, Andrew Grey, Greg Gamble & Keith J. Petrie, Impact of Brand 
or Generic Labeling on Medication Effectiveness and Side Effects, 35 HEALTH PSYCH. 187, 187-89 (2016). 
2 See Kate Faasse, Tim Cundy, Greg Gamble & Keith J. Petrie, The Effect of an Apparent Change 
to a Branded or Generic Medication on Drug Effectiveness and Side Effects, 75 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 
90, 93 (2013) (“The results of this study indicate that patients experience reduced effectiveness and 
increased medication-related side effects when changed from branded medication to drugs that are 
labeled as generic.”). 
3 See Aaron M. Garvey, Frank Germann & Lisa E. Bolton, Performance Brand Placebos: How 
Brands Improve Performance and Consumers Take the Credit, 42 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 931, 936-37 (2016) 
(finding that subjects who used golf putters labeled with a well-recognized brand name took fewer 
strokes to sink a putt than subjects who used the same putters with low-brand-recognition labels or 
no labels). 
4 See id. at 939 (finding that branded earplugs improved standardized test performance). 
5 See Paula Varela, Gastón Ares, Ana Giménez & Adriana Gámbaro, Influence of Brand 
Information on Consumers’ Expectations and Liking of Powdered Drinks in Central Location Tests, 21 FOOD 
QUALITY & PREFERENCE 873, 879 (2010) (finding that consumers gave significantly higher scores 
to powdered drinks, particularly premium-branded drinks, in brand-informed taste tests than in 
blind taste tests). 
6 James C. Makens, Effect of Brand Preference Upon Consumers’ Perceived Taste of Turkey Meat, 49 
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 261, 261 (1965) (“[A] well-known brand [of turkey meat] positively affected the 
taste which [subjects] experienced for samples of turkey meat.”). 
7 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see generally 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:63 (5th ed. 2020) 
(explaining that trademark protection is not available for “functional” features, meaning those that 
“make[] the product more useful for its purpose or contribute[] to economy of manufacture or use”). 
8 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 n.5 (2020) (internal 
quotational marks omitted) (quoting TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32). 
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patents and copyrights) do not have term limits, and it would do more harm 
than good to allow a producer to monopolize a useful product feature forever.9 
Even if the feature is strongly associated with a single producer by the 
consuming public, it’s better to ensure that improvements to cost, quality, and 
use eventually pass into the public domain. 
The application of functionality doctrine might appear straightforward as 
well, at least at first glance. For example, near the turn of the twentieth 
century, Norwich Pharmacal began selling its novel stomach medicine—a 
pink-colored, liquid preparation of bismuth subsalicylate—under the 
trademark “Pepto-Bismol.”10 The product proved enormously popular and, by 
the 1950s, Pepto-Bismol was “nationally recognized and . . . undoubtedly the 
leader in the field of stomach assuagement.”11 Naturally, this created an 
opportunity for imitators, and competitor Sterling Drug soon began selling a 
product, identical in “chemistry [and] color,” under the name “Pepsamar.”12 
As the Second Circuit observed in the ensuing legal dispute, Norwich 
certainly could not obtain trademark protection for the bismuth subsalicylate 
composition itself: “[t]he medicinal ingredients, of course, are functional.”13 
But Norwich also could not obtain trademark protection for the distinctive 
pink hue: “the pink color . . . present[s] a pleasing appearance to the customer 
and to the sufferer,” and “a disordered stomach will accept that which is 
pleasing.”14 That is, the court recognized the more subtle functionality of the 
color pink’s “psycho-somatic effect.”15 
Norwich’s power to exclude competitors was thus limited to the mere 
name “Pepto-Bismol”—an assumedly harmless monopoly. But the placebo 
effect described above strongly suggests that a Pepto-Bismol by any other 
name will not actually be as effective, identical chemistry and color 
notwithstanding. So, functionality doctrine blocked trademark protection for 
some of Pepto-Bismol’s features that “affect[] . . . quality,”16 but not all—
despite the court’s explicit recognition of psychosomatic power. 
Contemporary cases have followed this unusual, seemingly contradictory 
pattern of allowing trademark protection for some features that affect quality 
but not others. Shire U.S.’s ADHD drug Adderall® is now off-patent, for 
 
9 See, e.g., infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
10 The History of Pepto-Bismol, PEPTO-BISMOL, https://pepto-bismol.com/en-us/article/the-
history-of-pepto [https://perma.cc/54VK-499S]. 
11 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1959). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 572 n.7. 
14 Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 167 F. Supp. 
427, 431 (N.D.N.Y. 1958)). 
15 Id. at 572 n.7. 
16 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. 
v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
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example, so generic manufacturers are free to sell chemically identical 
amphetamine salt tablets.17 And generic manufacturers are also free to mimic 
the color and shape of Adderall tablets, because there is a “clinical 
functionality that exists where a generic drug bears [visual] similarity to its 
branded version”18—“enhance[d] patient safety [based on] psychological 
acceptance.”19 Nevertheless, none of the generic manufacturers may use the 
name “Adderall” for their tablets; Shire alone will wield the psychological 
power of that name, perhaps in perpetuity. 
Trademark law’s apparent tolerance of this placebo functionality is a 
puzzle that contradicts the plain terms of Supreme Court precedent, but it is 
surprisingly not unique. On the contrary, there are a wide variety of product 
features that would seem to be functional under the Court’s definition, yet 
obtain trademark protection without much scrutiny. Consider a Louis Vuitton 
clutch. At least some—perhaps most—of the purpose of this kind of high-
status luxury item is conspicuous consumption. When consumers wear the 
clutch in public, they display its trademark features, such as the famous V 
print, which other observers recognize. The consumer is thus able to convey 
social status and economic power. The V-printed clutch, in other words, has a 
“use or purpose”20 entirely separate from its basic ability to hold cards or keys. 
Independent of the product’s physical integrity, carrying capacity, or 
durability, the trademark print itself performs a highly sought-after social 
function. Nevertheless, the famous logo and print marks associated with 
luxury brands do not appear to be in any serious danger of invalidation for 
functionality. 
Further examples abound, from certification marks reducing the costs of 
industrial organization,21 to shape and color marks affecting the quality of 
interoperability.22 But this doctrinal puzzle goes well beyond the specifics of 
any particular fact pattern to the basic features shared by all trademarks. It is 
bedrock legal theory that trademarks act to reduce search costs for 
consumers23 as well as provide a reputational incentive for producers to 
 
17 See Jason Douglas, Adderall Patent Expiration Hits Shire, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2010, 7:59AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704302304575213762971012660 
[https://perma.cc/UP39-PUK6]; see also Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., No. 02-2023, 2002 WL 
32345397, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2002) (noting that Adderall tablets are “amphetamine salt tablets”), 
aff ’d 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003). 
18 Shire, 2002 WL 32345397, at *5. 
19 Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 393 F.3d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 2003). 
20 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). 
21 See infra subsection II.B.iii. 
22 See infra subsection II.B.v. 
23 See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 15 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that a traditional justification for 
trademark protection is to give consumers confidence that they “will get the product[s] which [they] 
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improve and maintain product quality.24 Any worthwhile trademark, in other 
words, “affects the cost or quality”25 of the underlying article—and should 
thus be invalidated as functional. This cannot be the correct result, yet it is 
paradoxically demanded by the governing case law. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, despite a century of jurisprudence (and two 
decades since the last relevant Supreme Court opinion), functionality 
doctrine has proved nearly impossible to define in practice. The doctrine is, 
at its core, based on a facially incoherent standard that cannot mean what it 
says, leaving no actual guidance to courts and administrators below. If only 
some effects on cost, quality, and use are actually impermissible, then which 
ones? The case law seems to accommodate a multitude of answers. Perhaps 
those that rise to the level of patentability.26 Perhaps those that suppress 
competition.27 Perhaps those that are utilitarian, rather than aesthetic.28 The 
various combinations, weights, and definitions that could be assigned to these 
criteria lead to a multiplicity of rules and standards in turn. 
The history of functionality doctrine shows precisely this kind of disarray. 
Faced with the task of actually adjudicating functionality, charitable judges 
describe the doctrine as “checkered,”29 lacking “clarity,”30 and simply 
“confusing.”31 As one district court judge expressed after a bench trial on the 
matter: “Even a summary of the law defining the various components of this 
concept would be voluminous.”32 The Supreme Court’s own holdings are 
 
ask[] for and which [they] want[] to get”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
79-1333, at 3 (1946)); see also William M. Landes, Posner on Beanie Babies, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1761, 
1763 (2007) (“Trademarks reduce search costs by providing consumers relevant information on 
attributes of goods and services they buy.”); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 39, 52 (2008) (“Trademarks reduce search costs for consumers . . . .”). 
24 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 2:4 (“[T]rademarks create an incentive to keep up a good 
reputation for a predictable quality of goods.”); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 179 (2003) (“[A] 
firm with a valuable trademark will be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would 
suffer a capital loss on its investment in the trademark. . . . [L]egal protection of trademarks 
encourages the production of higher-quality products.”); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A 
History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 555 (2006) (“[P]rotecting 
the exclusivity of a mark supports seller incentives to maintain and improve product quality.”). 
25 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). 
26 See, e.g., infra notes 90, 113 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., infra notes 73, 91-96, 113, 115 and accompanying text. 
28 See, e.g., infra notes 45, 77, 99, 121-23. 
29 See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The doctrine . . . has a somewhat checkered history.”). 
30 See, e.g., Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 
2002) (“However, the definition of ‘functionality’ has not enjoyed such clarity.”). 
31 See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1049 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“Although the 
sundry facts involved in various disputes aid in distinguishing some cases from others, attempted 
definitions . . . remain somewhat confusing.”). 
32 Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 95 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (emphasis added). 
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limited to brief dicta or cryptic attempts at synthesis and revision; circuit 
splits emerge and are barely papered over, only to reemerge again; and even 
the USPTO acts in some tension with prevailing case law.33 
This Article suggests a novel theory of functionality doctrine that is 
grounded in the full history of precedent, coherently applicable to all 
trademarks, and—most importantly—descriptively accurate to real-world 
eligibility outcomes. That is: a functionality theory centered on fragility. 
There are some product features that affect cost, quality, use, or purpose in 
ways that are non-fragile; the feature can be copied by all producers 
simultaneously without weakening or destroying its effects. The chemical 
compounds ibuprofen and amphetamine sulfate are functional in this sense. 
There is no difference in their pharmacological efficacy, administered blind, 
whether the compounds are produced by one company or one thousand. So 
too with, e.g., Pepto-Bismol’s pink color—the psychosomatic soothing effect 
does not depend on exclusivity. And in fact, trademark protection for these 
compounds and colors is not permitted. But the names “Nurofen,” “Adderall,” 
and “Pepto-Bismol” are only functional in a fragile way; allowing every 
producer the freedom to use them would eventually eliminate the positive 
consumer associations and beliefs that gave rise to placebo effects in the first 
place. As a result, trademark protection is granted without a second thought. 
Likewise, a Louis Vuitton clutch might have many functional attributes 
that are non-fragile, such as a more durable leather or an easier-to-
manufacture clasp. Other producers can duplicate those features without 
somehow decreasing the Louis Vuitton clutch’s durability or increasing its 
manufacturing costs. And again, trademark protection for such features 
would not be permitted. The V print, on the other hand, clearly loses its social 
effects if every producer is free to use it. It would no longer convey anything 
meaningful about wealth or exclusivity if it regularly appeared on cheap and 
common items. There is a demonstrable function to the V print, but it is 
intrinsically fragile. It disappears without the protection offered by trademark 
law itself—and accordingly, that protection will be granted. 
A fragility theory of functionality more coherently explains the 
recognition and celebration of trademarks’ common search-cost and quality-
reputation effects. These functionalities are fragile as well, so they do not bar 
trademark protection. The Coca-Cola® mark, for example, reduces search 
costs for consumers by allowing them to quickly and reliably locate genuine 
Coca-Cola Company products. But if every soda manufacturer were free to 
use the same mark, it would cease to serve as a meaningful and credible signal 
in the marketplace. In a similar fashion, the Coca-Cola Company has a strong 
incentive to ensure consumers have positive experiences with Coca-Cola-
 
33 See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
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branded products, but only if other companies are not able to free-ride on 
that goodwill. Absent trademark protection, the incentives for quality driven 
by reputation largely disappear. 
Fragility also manages to unify functionality doctrine with the rest of 
trademark law—and the rest of intellectual property. Within trademark law, 
a fragility theory of functionality turns out to map perfectly onto the 
treatment of more traditional marks like names and symbols. “Generic” 
names and symbols can never receive protection, for example, even in the 
presence of secondary meaning34—just like functional marks.35 The Coca-
Cola Company can’t, for example, obtain a trademark on the word “soda” for 
its carbonated beverages, regardless of its dominance in that market. 
Genericness, then, is simply a non-fragile form of linguistic functionality. 
The existence of a uniform, shared signifier like “soda” allows all such 
producers to easily describe—and consumers to easily locate—the correct 
category of products or services. Whether it’s seen on a grocery-aisle sign, 
typed into a search bar, or written on an aluminum can, the word “soda” 
facilitates transactions by helping relevant buyers and sellers identify each 
other. This efficiency is not fragile; on the contrary, it is at its highest when 
the signifier is used by all producers in the market. In intellectual property 
more broadly, this concept of fragility has strong parallels to the incentive 
theory more commonly associated with and embraced by patent law36 and 
copyright law.37 That is, just as patent and copyright seem to distinguish 
between creations that do and don’t require the incentive effects of patent or 
 
34 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“This means that even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some ‘merely descriptive’ 
marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark.”). 
35 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001) (“The 
Lanham Act . . . does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment 
has been made to encourage the public to associate [it] with a single manufacturer or seller.”). 
36 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly 
was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, 
an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 2 
(1st ed. 2008) (“Our patent laws operate as part of an interdependent mix of incentives and restraints 
. . . offering a potential financial reward as an inducement to invent . . . .”); Michael Abramowicz & 
John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1593-94 (2011) (describing 
the explanatory power of the “inducement standard” with respect to the nonobviousness 
requirement of patentability). 
37 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Sara K. Stadler, 
Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 433 (2007) (“Nothing is more 
fundamental to copyright law than the concept of incentives.”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003) (“‘[I]ncentive language . . . pervades the Supreme Court’s 
copyright jurisprudence,’ and it is through incentive language that judges are most empowered to 
make copyright law work as it should.”) (quoting Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996)). 
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copyright protection to exist, trademark law seems to distinguish between 
enhancements that do and don’t require its protection to manifest. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the history of 
functionality in trademark law up to the present, not only to provide context 
for the unfamiliar reader, but to highlight the themes that have consistently 
animated the doctrine over time. Lower courts’ precise interpretations of 
functionality have varied considerably, making the overall body of case law 
appear shambolic. But from the beginning, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated a strong preference for bright-line heuristics, an intentional 
focus on welfare maximization, and a clear understanding of marks and dress 
as conceptually unified. 
Part II begins by examining the problems with the Supreme Court’s 
current test for functionality—in brief, that it fails to provide guidance to 
lower courts or accurately describe case outcomes. Part II then offers an 
alternative theory of functionality, based on fragility, and provides a series of 
real-world examples and case studies to show its descriptive merits. The 
placebo and social functionalities introduced above are presented in full, 
alongside organizational, design, and interlocking functionalities. This 
fragility theory, moreover, is shown to account for even more basic concepts 
in trademark law—genericness and secondary meaning. 
Part III transitions from this largely descriptive theory to further application 
and normative examination. In particular, a fragility theory of functionality 
provides trademark law with internally consistent answers to some highly 
contested questions: overlapping protection under copyright law and protection 
against dilution or post-sale confusion. In short: the non-fragile functionalities of 
copyrighted material indicate that redundant protection under trademark law 
should generally not be permitted; by contrast, the fragile functionalities of well-
established marks provide a bounded justification for maintaining anti-dilution 
and post-sale confusion protections. 
Part III concludes by directly addressing the normative consequences of 
a fragility model of trademark functionality. As will be shown, offering 
trademark protection despite the presence of fragile functionalities can be 
welfare-enhancing in many cases. But at the same time, fragile functionalities 
may generate anticompetitive effects in the marketplace and lead to deeply 
regressive distributional consequences. Though a complete proposal for 
ameliorative measures is beyond the scope of this Article, an unusual case 
from antitrust law indicates a potential starting point for future research. 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRADEMARK FUNCTIONALITY 
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, still provides the basic framework for 
contemporary trademark law in the United States.38 Functionality doctrine, 
however, dates back even further—to the earliest federal trademark statutes 
and state competition laws. Though a perfectly complete history of the 
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, its broad arcs are worth 
examining for two reasons beyond background alone. First, despite 
significant changes to functionality doctrine over time, there are consistent 
themes in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that a descriptive theory should 
ideally account for: bright-line heuristics are preferred over more complex 
analyses; the ultimate goal is welfare maximization; and all types of marks 
and dress are conceptually linked. Second, today’s intercircuit 
disagreements—such as the bitter divisions over “aesthetic” and “utilitarian” 
functionality—are not new or transitory. Their origins can be traced back to 
the earliest periods of trade dress protection, and they are no closer to 
resolution today than they were decades ago. A more fundamental change in 
theory is required. 
A. Pre-Lanham Act Cases 
Today, the term “trademark” is used broadly to include not only “marks” 
in the sense of names, symbols, and seals marking a product and associated 
with it, but also “dress,” meaning the physical packaging and overall 
appearance of the product itself.39 The Coca-Cola Company, for example, 
currently holds a trademark not only on the name “Coca-Cola” for 
beverages,40 but also on the particular three-dimensional, curvy shape of its 
iconic glass soda bottles.41 In early case law, the distinction between these two 
categories was of much greater significance: marks enjoyed full protection 
 
38 Lanham Act, Pub. L. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
39 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (“The breadth 
of the definition of marks registrable under § 2 . . . has been held to embrace not just word marks 
. . . and symbol marks . . . , but also ‘trade dress’—a category that originally included only the 
packaging . . . but in recent years has been expanded . . . to encompass the design of a product.”); 
see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added) (defining “trademark” as “any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof”). 
40 COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0,238,145; The mark consists of the word Coca-Cola in a 
cursive, stylized font, Registration No. 1,530,904. 
41 The trademark consists of the distinctively shaped contour, or confirmation, and design of 
the bottle as shown, Registration No. 0,696,147. 
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against copying under the Lanham Act’s statutory predecessors, while trade 
dress generally did not.42 
Instead, plaintiffs looking to protect their trade dress sought relief under 
common-law principles governing unfair competition. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, it was well established that the risk of consumer harm via 
deception—producers “palming off” or “passing off” their goods as someone 
else’s through mimicry—demanded some measure of protection for dress. 
The distinct shape and color of one company’s coffee mill,43 the particular 
blue-marble paper cover of another’s letter files,44 and even the unique cone 
shape of a bakery’s bread loaves45 could enjoy protection against copying 
under the aegis of consumer welfare. In the Supreme Court’s words: 
Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage of the public in 
the quality and price of their goods, [and] in the beauty and taste-fulness of 
their enclosing packages . . . but they have no right, by imitative devices, to 
beguile the public into buying their wares under the impression they are 
buying those of their rivals.46 
At the same time, courts feared extending brand protection beyond the 
traditional kinds of marks like words, symbols, and seals. If done 
overzealously, they warned, such protection could “terminate or hopelessly 
cripple any competition” between the incumbent producer and its rivals.47 In 
particular, judges expressed concern that trade dress protection could make 
an end-run around patent law by monopolizing useful product features—an 
 
42 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (“[T]he trade-mark must be 
something other than, and separate from, the merchandise.”); Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951, 
952 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (“[A] trade-mark is always something indicative of origin or ownership, by 
adoption and repute, and is something different from the article itself which the mark designates.”); 
Moorman v. Hoge, 17 F. Cas. 715, 718 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (“[T]he size or shape of the barrel, box, or 
package can scarcely be considered a mark.”); cf. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & 
Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 170-71 (1906) (“Certainly a trade-mark could not be claimed of a 
rope, the entire surface of which was colored; and if color be made the essential feature, it should be 
so defined, or connected with some symbol or design, that other manufacturers may know what they 
may safely do.”). 
43 Enterprise Mfg. Co. of Pa. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 124 F. 923, 924 (C.C.D. Conn. 1903), 
aff ’d, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904). 
44 Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Brown & Besly, 121 F. 90, 91 (7th Cir. 1902). 
45 George G. Fox Co. v. Best Baking Co., 95 N.E. 747, 748-49 (Mass. 1911); George G. Fox Co. 
v. Hathaway, 85 N.E. 417, 418 (Mass. 1908). 
46 Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893). 
47 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1918) (“The 
question is always commercial; we ought not to impose any burdens which, either by changing the 
appearance of the article itself, or by imposing expense upon its production, will operate to give the 
plaintiff such advantage in the market as will substantially handicap his competitors.”). 
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especially dangerous outcome, given the former’s lack of term limits.48 It was this 
tension—between protecting consumers from deception and avoiding unnecessary, 
harmful monopolies—that gave rise to nascent functionality doctrine. 
The term “functional” began to appear commonly in the case law by the 
first few decades of the twentieth century, though the circuits quickly 
diverged on their precise formulation of the concept. The Seventh Circuit, 
for example, only afforded trade dress protection to features that constituted 
mere “ornamentation,” as opposed to “utilitarian . . . details.”49 In a similar 
vein, the Eighth Circuit focused on the product’s intended purpose, 
emphasizing the freedom to “make use of any material in the most available 
and efficient form,” to “best serve[] the mechanical uses for which [the] 
merchandise was designed.”50 But other jurisdictions denied trade dress 
protection to even purely aesthetic features, depending on market realities; 
as Judge Learned Hand wrote: 
[T]he design . . . may well be a part of the reason why the buyer chooses [a 
product.] To deny the second comer the right to use that design seems rather 
to step beyond the principle which protects only such symbols as are 
representative of the plaintiff ’s manufacture, nor does it seem an entirely 
adequate answer to say that the features enjoined are nonfunctional. It is only 
when the mechanical operativeness of the thing is certainly all that 
determines the buyer’s choice that such a criterion is safe.51 
Thus, in the Second Circuit, a silk manufacturer could not seek redress 
against a competitor that copied its fashionable and fanciful patterns,52 
precisely because those patterns contributed to the products’ success and 
popularity among consumers. 
 
48 Pope Automatic Merch. Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1911), cert 
denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912) (discussing the need to avoid granting a “gratuitous[] . . . monopoly,” one 
“more effective than that of [a] patent in the ratio of eternity to 17 years”); see, e.g., Keystone Type 
Foundry v. Portland Pub. Co., 186 F. 690, 692 (1st Cir. 1911) (citing Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 
N.E. 667 (Mass. 1901)) (“In the absence of a patent, the freedom of manufacture cannot be cut down 
under the name of preventing unfair competition.”); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 
1904) (“In the absence of protection by patent, no person can monopolize or appropriate to the 
exclusion of others elements of mechanical construction which are essential to the successful 
practical operation of a manufacture, or which primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the 
purpose to which it is devoted.”). 
49 Modern Grinder Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Churn & Mfg. Co., 22 F.2d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1927); see 
also Daniel v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833 (3d Cir. 1916) (permitting the copying of a 
corrugation pattern for rubber hose, finding that the pattern possessed “structural value”). 
50 A.Y. McDonald & Morrison Mfg. Co. v. H. Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 F. 972, 974 (8th Cir. 1910). 
51 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
52 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 
728 (1930). 
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Though the exact scope of trade dress functionality differed across courts, 
two unifying themes were clear from the beginning: the parallels to 
trademark scope, and the ultimate focus on the consuming public. In the 
world of trademarks, “generic” and “merely descriptive” words for products 
had long been recognized as beyond the scope of protection,53 whereas 
“fanciful” or “arbitrary” terms were easily found eligible for protection.54 
When discussing the functionality of trade dress, early courts often justified 
denying or granting protection on identical terms.55 Regarding consumers, if 
a defendant could modify the disputed feature in some way that disrupted 
the likelihood of buyers’ confusion—such as by changing its location,56 
shape,57 or color58—while nevertheless retaining the feature’s advantages, the 
courts were generally willing to grant protection to the original.59 Put 
 
53 See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1872) (“Nor can a generic name, or 
a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be 
employed as a trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection.”). 
54 See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 30 (1900) (“Saxlehner was the 
first to appropriate and use the name ‘Hunyadi’ as a trademark for bitter waters, and . . . such name 
being neither descriptive nor geographical, but purely arbitrary and fanciful as applied to medicinal 
waters, was the proper subject of a trademark.”). 
55 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co., 233 F. at 115 (“In such cases the . . . question is always whether 
the points of similarity are essential features of the thing sold. When they are, the right to copy them is 
necessarily involved in the right to sell that particular thing; if the plaintiff is affected, it is his mischance 
that his manufacture has not become associated with some arbitrary and unessential feature . . . .”); 
Daniel v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 830 (3rd. Cir. 1916) (“[T]he defendant . . . was at full 
liberty to . . . appropriate any device or form . . . which was designative in a generic manner of the 
distinctive style of hose manufactured by the plaintiff.”); Lektro-Shave Corp. v. Gen. Shaver Corp., 19 
F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Conn. 1937) (“It is well settled . . . that a manufacturer has good right to make any 
unpatented article embodying therein necessary functional parts . . . ; but, if he incorporates what is 
distinctive, ornamental, fanciful, or merely peculiar to another’s product, he may trespass.”); Diamond 
Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906) (“The head of two colors is in no proper 
sense a part of the dress of the match . . . . In use the tip must be distinguished from the head, for the 
match should be struck on the tip and not on the head . . . . The head and tip thus distinguished, each by 
its own color, is therefore a common characteristic . . . . , not specific, but generic, and properly applies 
to all tipped matches.”). 
56 See, e.g., McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 607, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1930) (“It is true 
that the visible protruding insulation serves a functional purpose, because it prevents contact 
between the emanating wires and the shell. An examination of the devices shows that such functional 
requirement does not necessitate placing these openings in any certain specified place.”). 
57 See, e.g., Lektro-Shave Corp., 19 F. Supp. at 845 (“[A]s far as defendant’s movable cutter is 
concerned, the cylindrical shape is unnecessary . . . . Obviously, any other shape could be used in 
defendant’s shaver head and . . . operate just as efficiently . . . .”). 
58 See, e.g., Pope Automatic Merch. Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981 (7th. Cir. 1911) 
(“In both [vacuum] cleaners the metal is unpainted. If appellants should be compelled to paint their 
[vacuum] cleaner a distinctive color, they would increase their manufacturing cost and would . . . 
lose one of the main advantages . . . .”). 
59 See generally Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 
56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 268 (2004) (“This analysis became the cornerstone of the functionality 
doctrine. If equally effective alternatives to a particular feature were available to competitors, the 
feature was deemed non-functional.”); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to Intellectual 
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differently, functionality depended on balancing the risk of consumer harm 
by confusion against harm by monopolization. To some degree, these two 
themes shared an intellectual foundation: “generic” features are those that most 
people would expect to be included when purchasing a given type of product, 
much as “generic” words are those that most people would use to refer to a given 
type of product. In both circumstances, competitors can scarcely avoid relying 
on the generic word or feature without significantly handicapping themselves in 
the marketplace—and leaving consumers worse off. 
By 1938, the Restatement of Torts acknowledged a distinction between 
“functional” and “nonfunctional” product features in its discussion of passing 
off and attempted to synthesize the varying strands of case law: “unprivileged 
imitation” of functional product features was permissible, so long as the 
imitator took “reasonable steps to inform prospective purchasers” of the true 
origin of their goods.60 A product feature was, in turn, defined as functional 
if it “affects the[] purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy 
of processing, handling or us[e].”61 In particular, the associated comment 
suggested that even purely aesthetic features could be functional: 
When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may 
be functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the 
performance of an object for which the goods are intended . . . . A candy box 
in the shape of a heart may be functional, because of its significance as a gift 
to a beloved one . . . . The determination of whether or not such features are 
functional depends upon the question of fact whether prohibition of 
imitation by others will . . . substantially hinder . . . competition.62 
But the Restatement did not explicitly discuss the relevance of alternative, 
workaround designs, putting it in tension with some circuits’ clear precedent.63 
That same year, the Supreme Court first delved into functionality 
doctrine in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.64 In 1930, plaintiff Nabisco 
acquired the longstanding Shredded Wheat Company, including its 
“Shredded Wheat” trademark for whole wheat cereal biscuits. Two years later, 
Nabisco sought to enjoin newcomer Kellogg from using the “Shredded 
Wheat” mark to describe its own product, as well as manufacturing its 
 
Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 108 (1998) (“The definition adopted by the courts for 
functionality, while varying somewhat . . . essentially limited functionality to those features that 
were needed for competition because of the unavailability of alternatives.”). 
60 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 741 (1938) (AM. L. INST. 1934). 
61 Id. § 742. 
62 Id. § 742 cmt. a. 
63 See generally Thurmon, supra note 59, at 273 (“This too marked an important change, as early 
courts had come to focus heavily on the availability of alternative designs. There was no explanation 
of why or how the Restatement reporters decided to define functionality in this way . . . .”). 
64 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
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product in a visually identical, pillow-shaped biscuit form.65 Nabisco initially 
succeeded, but the Court reversed both aspects of the injunction on appeal, 
treating the trademark and trade dress issues as conceptually parallel. 
At the outset, the Court observed that the original shredded wheat 
machines were previously covered by since-expired Shredded Wheat 
Company patents. It was under the monopoly of those patents that the term 
“Shredded Wheat” became strongly associated with the machines’ product 
and, because nobody else could yet use the machines, the Shredded Wheat 
Company. Hence, the Court reasoned, the “Shredded Wheat” term needed 
to follow the now freely usable machines: “It equally follows from the 
cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented device into the 
domain of things public that . . . there must also necessarily pass to the public 
the generic designation of the thing which has arisen during the monopoly.”66 
The Court applied the same logic to the biscuits’ pillow-shape; the original 
shredded wheat machines were “designed to produce only the pillow-shaped 
biscuits,” so “the form in which the article became known to the public” 
needed to follow the machines into the public domain.67 As the Court 
explained, preventing Kellogg from producing an identically named or 
shaped product would be the practical equivalent of extending the Shredded 
Wheat Company’s patents into perpetuity; in other words, it would violate 
the principle “that on the expiration of a patent, the monopoly granted by it 
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered . . . becomes 
public property.”68 
The Court offered additional support for its decision, using the term 
“functional” for the first time: “[T]he pillow-shape must be used [by Kellogg] 
for another reason. The evidence is persuasive that this form is functional—
that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if 
some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.”69 Hence, even 
though Kellogg was “undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article 
known as ‘Shredded Wheat’”—a market “created by the skill and judgment 
of” the original Shredded Wheat Company—the functional components of 
that product constituted “a right possessed by all,” and in “the free exercise of 
which the consuming public is deeply interested.”70 
The Supreme Court’s initial foray into functionality doctrine thus 
solidified the themes that had emerged in the lower courts. Although the 
doctrine continued to apply to trade dress only, the Court drew clear parallels 
 
65 Id. at 114-115. 
66 Id. at 118 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)). 
67 Id. at 119. 
68 Id. at 120 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)). 
69 Id. at 122. 
70 Id. 
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to the classification of word marks. Generic biscuit terms and generic biscuit 
shapes alike could not receive protection. At the same time, a fundamental 
concern for consumers—from their entitlement to the full public domain, to 
their interest in the exercise of full competition—carries through the Court’s 
language and decision. But a new theme also emerged, one that carries 
through to the present: a preference for heuristics over more detailed 
analyses. The Kellogg Court did not directly engage in something like market 
empirics or welfare economics. Rather, because the feature in question 
previously enjoyed patent protection and appeared to affect the cost and 
quality of the overall product, the Court presumed that granting the 
everlasting protection of trademark law would ultimately hurt the public. 
B. From the Lanham Act to Qualitex 
The Federal Trademark Act of 1946, better known as the Lanham Act, 
offered a wealth of changes to the extant federal structure for trademark 
protection.71 For example, whereas prior statutes allowed trademarks to 
persist in perpetuity by default, the Lanham Act required a reaffirmation of 
continued use every six years to avoid automatic cancellation.72 This 
requirement resulted in a cleaner registry, with fewer lingering, phantom 
marks. Most importantly for this discussion, the Lanham Act also essentially 
unified the treatment of marks and dress by expanding the overall definition of 
trademarks: “any word, name, symbol, or device[,] or any combination thereof 
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods . . . .”73 
This “device” phrasing was subsequently interpreted by the USPTO to 
bring trade dress into the general trademark fold,74 bringing functionality 
doctrine along with it. In particular, even though functionality doctrine still 
applied against trade dress first and foremost, and almost never against pure 
marks,75 courts continued to rely heavily on conceptual parallels between the 
 
71 Act of July 5, 1946, Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1994)). 
72 See id. § 8(a) (“[T]he registration of any mark . . . shall be canceled . . . unless within one 
year next preceding the expiration of such six years the registrant shall file in the Patent Office an 
affidavit showing that said mark is still in use . . . .”). 
73 Id. § 45 (emphasis added). 
74 See, e.g., Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229, 230-31 (Comm’r Pat. 1958) (“Where 
the record shows that a container of distinct appearance is adopted for the purpose of identifying an 
applicant’s brand . . . , the contour or conformation of the container may be a trademark—a symbol 
or device—which distinguishes the applicant’s goods . . . .”) (emphasis added); In re Duro-Test Corp., 
134 USPQ 137, 138 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (“[T]he Act of 1946 . . . provides that for the purposes of 
registration on the supplemental register, a mark may consist of any configuration of goods . . . .”). 
75 See Alexandra J. Roberts, Tagmarks, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 599, 625 (2017) (“The concept of 
functionality is usually limited to trade dress and seldom applied to word marks.”); Dan L. Burk, 
Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375, 1410 (2010) (arguing that computer-operational words like 
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two.76 But over the next several decades, courts adjudicating infringement 
actions under the Lanham Act struggled to find functionality’s precise 
contours—and continued to reach divergent results across jurisdictions. 
For example, the Eighth Circuit considered the existence of competitive 
alternatives highly relevant to functionality analysis, going so far as to define 
functionality explicitly in those terms: “The question in each case is whether 
protection against imitation will hinder the competitor in competition.”77 The 
Third Circuit, on the other hand, tended to reject evidence demonstrating the 
actual effects on competition, focusing instead on whether the feature at issue 
affected the product’s purpose or cost—to any degree.78 Regarding aesthetic 
considerations, the Ninth Circuit forbade trademark protection for purely 
ornamental designs on china, due to their functionality in terms of visual 
appeal.79 The Eighth Circuit appeared to take a similar approach.80 But other 
courts remained deeply skeptical that aesthetic appeal could ever constitute 
functionality and were loath to bar trademark protection for such features.81 
 
domain names, metatags, and search terms ought to be considered functional, while acknowledging 
that, “by and large, . . . functionality doctrine has never been applied to word marks”). 
76 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) 
(“Defendant contends that the shape and appearance of the Zippo lighter has become generic . . . .”); 
Audio Fid., Inc. v. High Fid. Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1960) (“[T]he appellant’s 
record jacket was attractive and desirable, but not . . . arbitrary or fanciful . . . .”); Fotomat Corp. v. 
Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 699 (D.N.J. 1977) (“The Court also finds that the kiosks 
are significantly different in all aspects of the design which are nonfunctional or fanciful, artistic and 
arbitrary . . . .”). 
77 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. V. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis 
added); see also id. (“[P]rohibition against the copying of [the feature] will not affect [defendant’s] 
competitive position in the marketplace.”). 
78 See, e.g., Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G.G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 175 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 1953) (“[P]laintiff does argue that there are many different shapes and sizes which defendants 
could use and still produce a workable can opener. This is true, but the same could be said of the 
pillow-shaped shredded wheat biscuit . . . .”); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 
F.2d 730, 731 (3d Cir. 1957) (“Plaintiffs in unfair competition cases are always able to conceive of 
other courses which defendants might have pursued.”). 
79 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (“These criteria require 
the classification of the designs in question here as functional . . . . [O]ne of the essential selling 
features of hotel china, if, indeed, not the primary, is the design. The attractiveness and eye-appeal 
of the design sells the china.”). 
80 See generally Thurmon, supra note 59, at 304-07 (discussing J.C. Penney Co v. H.D. Lee 
Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941), and Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 
874 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
81 To wit, the Third Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Pagliero as an example of 
overbreadth that it deliberately sought to avoid. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 
825 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that “[t]he difficulty with accepting such a broad view of aesthetic 
functionality,” such as that found in the Ninth Circuit’s Pagleiro decision, “is that it provides a 
disincentive for the development of imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the 
design, the less protection it would receive”); see also Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 
417, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1984); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. Roberts, 944 
F.2d 1235, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 
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It would take nearly fifty years of intercircuit division after Kellogg for the 
Supreme Court to again step in, first in a succinct footnote. In Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the Court stated simply: “In general 
terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of 
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”82 In addition to 
Kellogg, the Court cited Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. in support of this 
proposition—specifically, the portion of that opinion governing the 
preemption of state unfair competition law by federal patent law.83 Thus, 
despite the passage of a half-century, the same bright-line heuristics from 
Kellogg remained essentially intact. Trademark protection would not extend 
to product features that affected cost or quality (or “purpose” and “use”), in 
addition to product features that were (or could have been) patented. The 
more divisive questions of how to weigh competitive alternatives or whether 
to conceptually separate aesthetic and utilitarian appeal, meanwhile, 
remained unaddressed. 
Another passing reference to functionality in Supreme Court dicta would 
follow a decade thereafter. In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,84 though not 
actually reaching the issue of functionality, the Court cited the test used by the 
court below with seeming approval—despite its departure from Inwood: 
The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, 
if it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors 
and free competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark 
protection . . . . This serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by the 
exhaustion of a limited number of [options].85 
Two Pesos is thus unusual when viewed in isolation; without a demonstrable 
hindrance on competition, the feature’s effects on cost, quality, use, or 
purpose (and perhaps even its patentability) appear to be irrelevant to 
trademark eligibility. 
Almost immediately after Two Pesos, however, the Supreme Court 
addressed functionality much more substantially and reiterated the centrality 
of its own heuristic approach. Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Products Co.86 is perhaps 
best known for holding that a color itself (there, the green-gold hue of 
 
1994) (citing In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982)) (“[T]he Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals specifically rejected the notion that purely aesthetic features can in themselves confer 
. . . functionality on a proposed mark . . . .”). 
82 Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). 
83 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (“Just as a State cannot encroach 
upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair 
competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.”). 
84 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
85 Id. at 775. 
86 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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Qualitex’s dry cleaning pads) could meet the requirements for trademark 
protection.87 Defendant Jacobson, however, raised functionality as a central 
counterargument. And in rejecting that argument, the Court gave clear 
primacy to Inwood’s bright-line heuristic, treating Two Pesos’s competition 
analysis as a mere elaboration: 
This Court consequently has explained that, “[i]n general terms, a product 
feature is functional,” and cannot serve as a trademark, “if it is essential to 
the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article,” that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a 
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.88 
Indeed, the cost-quality-purpose-use test was treated as dispositive with 
respect to the matter at hand: “[T]his latter fact—the fact that sometimes 
color is not essential to a product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or 
quality—indicates that the doctrine of ‘functionality’ does not create an 
absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark.”89 
The Court, referencing both the search-cost reductions and quality-
reputation incentives of trademarks, once again framed its decision a matter 
of improving and safeguarding welfare.90 Simultaneously, the Court 
emphasized how its conclusion rested on a unified conception of all kinds of 
trademarks, including trade dress: “It is the source-distinguishing ability of a 
mark—not its ontological status as a color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—
that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”91 The Court likewise opined at 
length on the boundaries between trademark and patent law vis-à-vis 
competition, noting in particular that “[i]t is the province of patent law, not 
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over 
new product designs or functions for a limited time.”92 
Overall, the back-and-forth of Inwood and Two Pesos—combined with 
Qualitex’s merger of language from both—did little to unify the lower courts 
on how to actually decide individual cases of functionality. At the same time, 
the overarching themes from the earliest cases still essentially carried through 
this middle period: an underlying focus on welfare, an understanding of 
 
87 Id. at 160-61. 
88 Id. at 165 (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
850 (1982)). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 163-64 (quoting 1 J. McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2.01[2] (3d ed. 1994)) (“[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a 
source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions’ . . . . At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 164-65. 
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marks and dress as conceptually unified, and a preference for bright-line 
rules. The modern era, punctuated by the Supreme Court’s most recent 
opinion discussing functionality, fits the same pattern—but still shows 
significant confusion among the lower courts. 
C. TrafFix and the Present 
The circuit courts immediately split in their interpretations of Inwood and 
Two Pesos in light of Qualitex. The First Circuit, for example, continued to 
treat Inwood’s cost, quality, use, and purpose test as fully dispositive.93 The 
Tenth Circuit also maintained a bright-line rule, but one leveled against 
trademark protection for patented (or seemingly patentable) features 
instead.94 A set of circuits—including, at minimum, the Fifth,95 Sixth,96 
Ninth,97 and Federal98—instead treated the theme of enhancing legitimate 
competition as a superseding standard: “The appropriate question is whether 
the particular product configuration is a competitive necessity . . . . Having 
any effect on cost or quality is not enough.”99 At the time, the Restatements 
of Law tended to incorporate this approach.100 
Meanwhile, the mere notion of aesthetic functionality continued to be a 
major point of contention between jurisdictions. Qualitex and its predecessors 
were especially ambiguous on this matter; though the Qualitex Court cited to 
a restatement comment that used the term “aesthetic functionality” when 
 
93 See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 37 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165) (“A design is, inter alia, non-functional if it is not ‘essential to the use or 
purpose of the article’ and does not ‘affect[] the cost or quality of the article.’”). 
94 See, e.g., Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 
1995) (“Where a product configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention covered 
by a utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade dress protection.”). 
95 See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 255 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)) (“The ultimate inquiry 
concerning functionality . . . is whether characterizing a feature or configuration as protected will 
hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of 
goods.”). 
96 See, e.g., Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 1999) 
rev’d 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
97 See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 
quotations omitted) (“The requirement of nonfunctionality is based on the . . . fundamental right 
to compete . . . .”). 
98 See, e.g., In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (observing that where 
“competition is hindered” sufficiently by trademarking, a feature is functional). 
99 Mktg. Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 940. 
100 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 
1993) (“Thus, in determining whether a particular design is ‘functional’ and therefore ineligible for 
protection as a trademark, the ultimate inquiry is whether a prohibition against copying will 
significantly hinder competition by others.”). 
2021] A Fragility Theory of Trademark Functionality  1845 
discussing color trademarks in general,101 the Court itself never adopted the 
concept. Indeed, the Court’s actual analysis of Qualitex’s green-gold cleaning 
pads seemed to consider effects that were only utilitarian (such as staining 
risk or production cost), with no mention of general aesthetic appeal or visual 
attraction.102 Thus, in the years after Qualitex, some courts confidently labeled 
aesthetic functionality an “unnecessary and illogical” doctrine, one that 
“denie[s] trade dress protection to design features whose only sin was to 
delight the senses.”103 Other courts, equally confident, defended the notion 
robustly: “It would be arbitrary as well as puritanical and even philistine to deny 
that one function of modern consumer packaging is to be beautiful . . . . A 
producer cannot in the name of trade dress prevent his competitors from 
making their products as visually entrancing as his own.”104 The Fifth Circuit, 
noting the significant confusion and ambiguity, chose a third option—
dodging the question entirely.105 
In 2001, six years after Qualitex, the Supreme Court stepped in again. 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v Marketing Displays, Inc. offers the Supreme Court’s most 
recent—and thorough—direct discussion of functionality doctrine to date.106 
Plaintiff Marketing Displays, Inc. (“MDI”) held patents on its design for 
temporary traffic and outdoor signs: two coiled springs, spaced apart, 
attaching the sign to its base.107 This “dual-spring design” allowed for flexion, 
preventing the sign from blowing over “despite adverse wind conditions.”108 
After the patents expired, defendant TrafFix began selling signs with a similar 
spring mechanism. MDI sued for, inter alia, trade dress infringement based 
 
101 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1993)). 
102 See id. at 166 (emphasis in original) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1991)) (“[T]he green-gold color serves no other function. 
[]Although it is important to use some color on press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the court found 
‘no competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally 
usable.’”) ; see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7:80 (“[The TrafFix Court] made what was, to 
this author, the amazing and incomprehensible statement that in the 1995 Qualitex case, ‘aesthetic 
functionality was the central question.’”). 
103 Krueger Int’l., Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Gucci 
Timepieces Am., Inc. v. Yidah Watch Co., 1998 WL 650078, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Aesthetic 
functionality is a discredited theory which has been used only sparingly . . . .”). 
104 Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see 
also Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Traditionally 
applied to prevent the recognition of trademark protection for useful features of a product, the 
functionality doctrine extends to the aesthetic aspects of a product’s design.”). 
105 See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 540 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Without 
deciding the viability of aesthetic functionality in this circuit, we note that, . . . the golf-hole designs 
at issue are not aesthetically functional.”). 
106 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
107 See U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696; U.S. Patent No. 3,662,482 (claiming a poster display device 
supported by an unanchored base and springs). 
108 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 25. 
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on the design, which it argued had become a distinctive indicator to 
consumers of MDI products.109 
The Court rejected trademark eligibility for the dual-spring design on the 
basis of functionality, making three key doctrinal moves in the process. First, 
though the Court noted that the patentability of a feature “has vital 
significance” and constitutes “strong evidence” of functionality, it held that 
patentability was not fully dispositive; a plaintiff might show, for example, 
that the feature “is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect” of 
the particular device at hand despite its utility in other contexts.110 Second, 
the Court more explicitly subordinated any competition analysis to Inwood’s 
cost-quality-use-purpose heuristic by directly acknowledging, for the first 
time, the long-disputed distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
product features: 
Discussing trademarks, we have said “‘[i]n general terms, a product 
feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a trademark, ‘if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.’” 
Expanding upon the meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a 
functional feature is one the “exclusive use of [which] would put competitors 
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” . . . The Qualitex 
decision did not purport to displace [the cost-quality-purpose-use] rule. 
Instead, it quoted the rule as Inwood had set it forth. It is proper to inquire 
into a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” in cases of esthetic 
functionality, the question involved in Qualitex. Where the design is functional 
under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider 
if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.111 
The Court thus explained that the existence of “other design possibilities” 
or workaround alternatives is only to be considered after the primary Inwood 
test for functionality.112 If the Inwood cost-quality-use-purpose test is met on 
its face, alternative designs are irrelevant: “Here, the functionality of the 
spring design means that competitors need not explore whether other spring 
juxtapositions might be used . . . . Other designs need not be attempted.”113 
Finally, the Supreme Court reiterated its familiar focus on welfare 
maximization. In brief, “protection for trade dress exists to promote 
competition” on beneficial terms, by balancing the risk of “confusion . . . as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods” against “the recognition 
that in many instances . . . [a]llowing competitors to copy will have salutary 
 
109 Id. at 26; see also Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 278 (E.D. 
Mich. 1997). 
110 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30. 
111 Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
112 Id. at 33. 
113 Id. at 33-34. 
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effects,” such as “significant advances in technology.”114 For example, in 
rejecting the suggestion that TrafFix could make a new design, concealing its 
similar-looking springs with a cover, the Court observed that “buyers are 
assured the product serves its purpose by seeing the operative mechanism”; 
“[i]t would be . . . something of a paradox, were we to require the 
manufacturer to conceal the very item the user seeks.”115 The interlocking 
interests of buyers and sellers, in other words, remained key. 
The Court has not directly addressed functionality doctrine since TrafFix, 
though it continues to quote the cost-quality-use-purpose language with 
approval.116 Nevertheless, nearly two decades later, the details remain in 
disarray. First and foremost, circuit courts continue to diverge in their precise 
treatment of competitive effects in functionality analysis. The Federal 
Circuit, for example, immediately held that its pre-TrafFix analytical 
framework would remain undisturbed—an unweighted, multifactor test 
seemingly at odds with the Court’s holding.117 This holding has been cited by 
the USPTO with approval, and features prominently in its Trademark 
Manual of Examining Procedure.118 The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach, 
retaining its overriding focus on competition: “[T]he ultimate issue on 
functionality is whether [plaintiff ’s] ‘particular integration of elements leaves 
a multitude of alternatives to the . . . industry . . . .’”119 Meanwhile, other 
circuits concluded that TrafFix required them to scrap their existing case law 
outright, and to lean in fully to a bright-line approach. The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, observed that its prior focus on effective competition had been 
unambiguously “supersede[d]” by TrafFix.120 The Seventh Circuit likewise 
stated that “TrafFix rejected an equation of functionality with necessity; it is 
enough that the design be useful.”121 
Second, the Supreme Court’s passing mention of aesthetic functionality 
did little to unify the lower courts’ long-divided treatment of the issue. The 
Second Circuit, for instance, continues to embrace the notion fully, holding 
 
114 Id. at 28-29 (internal quotations omitted). 
115 Id. at 34. 
116 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 (2020) (quoting 
TrafFix,532 U.S. at 32). 
117 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274-76 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the 
factors the Federal Circuit applies when considering if a product design is functional are”(1) the 
existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of the design; (2) advertising 
materials in which the originator of the design touts . . . utilitarian advantages; (3) the availability 
to competitors of functionally equivalent designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results in 
a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the product”). 
118 See TMEP § 1202.02(a)(iii)(A) (Rev. 1, Oct. 2018) (citing Valu. Eng’g, Inc.’s discussion of 
TrafFix). 
119 Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
120 Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002). 
121 Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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that even aesthetic features can be “essential to the use or purpose” of a 
product, or “affect[] [its] cost or quality.”122 The Seventh Circuit holds much 
the same,123 and the Eleventh Circuit seems to agree.124 The Fifth Circuit, on 
the other hand, “has consistently rejected the concept of aesthetic 
functionality” in its entirety—and “do[es] not believe that the Court’s dictum 
in TrafFix requires [it] to abandon [that] long-settled view.”125 The Federal 
Circuit has expressed similar skepticism;126 indeed, despite its singular 
importance in reviewing trademark application appeals, the Federal Circuit 
has not referred to the concept of aesthetic functionality in any trademark 
cases for over fifteen years.127 Some circuits simply continue to hedge on the 
matter, whether explicitly as a matter of avoidance,128 or as the consequence 
of ambiguous, back-and-forth case law in practice.129 
Thus, despite more than a century of grappling with the concept—and 
repeated interventions by the Supreme Court—functionality doctrine 
remains a cryptic, confusing patchwork. But the lower courts are not merely 
being intransigent. As will be shown in Part II, their division is in many ways 
a necessary consequence of the Court’s failure to recognize the full potential 
of trademarks’ power. These edge cases demonstrate economic, social, and 
psychological phenomena that challenge the current understanding of 
functionality doctrine. At the same time, they suggest a new and more unified 
model, based on fragility. A more robust discussion of the normative 
 
122 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 220 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
123 See, e.g., Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Fashion is a 
form of function. A design’s aesthetic appeal can be as functional as its tangible characteristics.”); 
Eco Mfg., 357 F.3d at 654 (“Aesthetic appeal can be functional; often we value products for their 
looks.”). 
124 See, e.g., Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 n.7, (11th Cir. 
2004) (“Likewise, the color, shape, and size of dippin’ dots are ‘aesthetic functions’ . . . .”). 
125 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 
F.3d 465, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2008). 
126 See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis 
in original) (arguing that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s own language, “aesthetic functionality 
was not the central question in the Qualitex case,” and avoiding reliance on the doctrine). 
127 Id. But see Auto. Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Global Tech., LLC, 930 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019) (using the term “aesthetic functionality” once in the context of a design patent dispute to 
reject appellant’s argument). 
128 See, e.g., Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“It seems we have not yet plainly stated which test we would apply under aesthetic 
functionality doctrine, or that we have even adopted aesthetic functionality doctrine at all. We need 
not decide these questions today.”). 
129 See Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1227, 1245 n.97 (2015) (“Ninth Circuit panels [have] wandered across a spectrum of positions 
from denying aesthetic functionality exists . . . to applying the doctrine vigorously.”); Mark P. 
McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 849 (2011) (“The Ninth Circuit takes a 
different position on the doctrine nearly every time it comes up.”). 
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consequences, both good and bad, of following such an approach to 
functionality is reserved for Part III. But this reformulation turns out to be, 
at minimum, more descriptively accurate with respect to current case 
outcomes and the arc of functionality jurisprudence to date. 
II. A FRAGILITY THEORY OF FUNCTIONALITY 
A. The Trouble with TrafFix 
Recall the current test for functionality, coming first from Inwood and 
reaffirmed in TrafFix: a product feature is functional if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the product, or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
product.130 On the one hand, this may not be a necessary condition for 
functionality, as the Supreme Court acknowledged the relevance of 
competitive disadvantages and alternatives in certain cases.131 But, in the 
Supreme Court’s own words, effects on cost or quality—or being essential to 
use or purpose—are fully sufficient conditions for functionality to be found: 
“there is no need to proceed further” once that test is met.132 
There is an immediate problem with this formulation: all trademarks 
affect cost and quality. Full stop. Trademarks reduce search costs for 
consumers by providing a “consistent signal,” allowing consumers to 
immediately and reliably use their prior product experiences and extrinsic 
information (such as reviews or word-of-mouth recommendations) to guide 
purchasing decisions.133 A hypothetical consumer who wants to specifically 
purchase Starbucks coffee is able to quickly and easily confirm that they are 
getting the genuine product when they see the green-and-white logo on a 
storefront or bottle. They are thus saved from having to engage in more costly 
measures to ensure authenticity, such as asking the store proprietor for proof 
of a legitimate franchise agreement, cross-referencing ingredient lists and 
manufacturing locations, or simply repeated trial and error. 
 
130 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 523 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001); see also U.S. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 n.5 (2020). 
131 TrafFix, 523 U.S. at 32-33. 
132 Id. at 33. 
133 David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 10-11 (2007); see also 
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW 
AND POLICY 15 (2d ed. 2007) (describing a consumer confidence justification for trademark 
protections); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 1555, 1563 (2010) (“[T]rademarks . . . reduce search costs by condensing complex 
meanings into concise and unequivocal terms, and they allow buyers to trust and rely upon the 
signals conveyed by sellers . . . .”); William M. Landes, Posner on Beanie Babies, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1761, 1763 (2007) (“Trademarks reduce search costs by providing consumers relevant information on 
attributes of goods and services they buy.”); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 39, 52 (2008) (“Trademarks reduce search costs for consumers . . . .”). 
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Trademarks also improve product quality, by creating an incentive for 
producers to “keep up a good reputation” for their goods and services.134 To 
take the same example, Starbucks has little reason to invest in quality 
ingredients and service if inferior coffee chains are free to appropriate its 
marks. Consumers would have no way of reliably distinguishing genuine 
Starbucks coffee from lower–quality imitations prior to purchasing, putting 
downward pressure on prices and making investments in product quality 
fundamentally unprofitable. 
These search-cost and quality-incentive benefits of trademarks are 
bedrock principles of the field, not mere academic curiosities or post-hoc 
justifications. They feature prominently in trademark jurisprudence itself; an 
expressed intention to maintain them is even, at times, the sole explanation 
given for adopting one rule or interpretation over another.135 The test stated 
in TrafFix—labeling “a product feature [as] functional . . . if it . . . affects the 
cost or quality of the article”136—cannot, therefore, be read literally without 
contradicting the entire corpus of trademark law to date. If all effects on cost 
or quality are impermissibly functional, then any trademark with even a 
modicum of public recognition would be invalid. 
This readily explains the disarray in functionality law amongst the lower 
circuits. If only some effects on cost or quality are actually impermissible, then 
which ones? The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence seems to accommodate a 
multitude of answers. Perhaps those that rise to the level of patentability. 
Perhaps those that suppress competition. Perhaps those that are utilitarian, 
rather than aesthetic. The various combinations, weights, and thresholds that 
could be assigned to these criteria in turn generate further confusion. 
The other half of TrafFix’s test for functionality—whether the feature in 
question is essential to the use or purpose of the product—is no less difficult 
to square with the inherent nature of trademarks. In short: real-world 
consumers quite frequently purchase products for the purpose of using a 
trademark, rather than the underlying product itself. Conspicuous 
consumption is perhaps the most straightforward example. Consider a luxury, 
 
134 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:4; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 179 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2003) (“[A] firm with a valuable trademark will be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because 
it would suffer a capital loss on its investment in the trademark . . . . [L]egal protection of trademarks 
encourages the production of higher-quality products.”); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A 
History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 555 (2006) (“[P]rotecting 
the exclusivity of a mark supports seller incentives to maintain and improve product quality.”). 
135 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (“In principle, 
trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the 
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions . . . [and] encourage[s] the production 
of quality products . . . .”). 
136 TrafFix, 523 U.S. at 32. 
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high-status item like a Louis Vuitton purse; when wearing the purse, a 
consumer displays its trademarked aspects (such as the famous V print), which 
most observers immediately recognize. The consumer is thereby able to 
convey social cachet and economic power. This kind of use is fairly described 
as “essential”—certainly from the perspective of the consumer’s purchasing 
decision and price point. That is, a purse from an unrecognizable brand that 
is otherwise equal in objective quality, material, and ability to hold items is 
highly unlikely to be a satisfactory substitute for the Louis Vuitton buyer (at 
least not without a tremendous discount in retail price). 
High-end fashion is an extreme case of consumers’ desire to use marks in 
and of themselves, but it’s far from the only example. Humans have a 
universal need to form a coherent and distinct sense of self137—and in 
modern, urban society, that need is increasingly met through consumption.138 
By protecting trademarks from unchecked copying, the law inherently 
strengthens their power to meet this need and differentiate product users 
from the masses. Other recognizable symbols can easily lose their salience 
through overuse and co-opting, but trademarks can be rigorously policed and 
curated with the threat of legal action. As a result, “many of our most 
powerful and unambiguous forms of social distinction, if not more broadly of 
lived meaning, come to us now” through marks.139 
Much like the cost and quality effects described above, these social uses 
and purposes of trademarks are well known to the courts—and fully 
 
137 For a discussion of the psychological need for a distinct sense of self, see generally C.R. 
SNYDER & HOWARD L. FROMKIN, UNIQUENESS: THE HUMAN PURSUIT OF DIFFERENCE 13 
(1980); Vivian L. Vignoles, Xenia Chryssochoou & Glynis M. Breakwell, The Distinctiveness 
Principle: Identity, Meaning, and the Bounds of Cultural Relativity, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 
REV. 337 (2000); Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same 
Time, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 475, 478 (1991). 
138 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
809, 820 (2010) (“Over the past century, and particularly in . . . urban, industrialized societies . . . , 
individuals have increasingly acted on this motivation [to differentiate themselves] through the 
consumption of what they perceive to be and what they believe others perceive to be differentiating 
goods.”); MIKE FEATHERSTONE, CONSUMER CULTURE AND POSTMODERNISM 86 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“The modern individual within consumer culture is made conscious that he speaks not only with 
his clothes, but with his home, furnishings, decoration, car and other activities which are to be read 
and classified in terms of the presence and absence of taste.”); Kelly Tepper Tian & Karyn McKenzie, 
The Long-Term Predictive Validity of the Consumers’ Need for Uniqueness Scale, 10 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 
171, 172 (2001) (“Conceptually defined, consumers’ need for uniqueness refers to individuals’ pursuit 
of differentness relative to others that is achieved through . . . consumer goods for the purpose of 
developing and enhancing one’s personal and social identity.”); Wilfred Amaldoss & Sanjay Jain, 
Pricing of Conspicuous Goods: A Competitive Analysis of Social Effects, 42 J. MKTG. RSCH. 30, 30 (2005) 
(emphasis added) (“An important implication of [uniqueness research] is that people could 
potentially choose to buy a different product merely for the sake of being different from other 
consumers, rather than to display their wealth or social status.”). 
139 Beebe, supra note 138, at 879. 
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accepted.140 The rear-pocket stitching pattern on Levi’s jeans may not be 
copied, for example, because their “sales [would] be affected adversely by . . . 
buyers’ ultimate realization that the pattern is no longer exclusive.”141 
Likewise, Gucci’s watch designs may not be duplicated, because consumers 
“will be discouraged from acquiring a genuine Gucci . . . [if] the items have 
become too commonplace and no longer possess the prestige and status 
associated with them.”142 The judiciary even recognizes the social salience and 
cachet of GMC truck grills: “[T]he purchaser of an original may be harmed 
if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the original’s value by 
making the previously scarce commonplace . . . .”143 
Once again, then, the functionality test in TrafFix cannot mean what it 
says—not without contradicting much of the existing case law and 
invalidating the most recognizable and socially meaningful marks that exist 
today. In the Ninth Circuit’s words: 
[T]rademarks have assumed an exalted status of their own in today’s 
consumer culture that cannot neatly be reduced to the historic function of 
trademark to designate source. Consumers sometimes buy products bearing 
marks such as the Nike Swoosh, the Playboy bunny ears, the Mercedes tri-
point star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos, for the 
appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies the origin or 
sponsorship of the product.144 
And yet, it observes paradoxically, “courts have been loathe to declare 
unique, identifying logos and names as functional.”145 Indeed, courts reject 
such (rarely made) arguments with little explanation.146 
There are glosses on the text of TrafFix that approximate solutions, but 
none are truly satisfactory. For example, one might argue that, as a threshold 
matter, functionality doctrine simply does not apply to traditional marks like 
words and symbols—only to dress. As noted in Part I, the division between 
trademarks and trade dress was originally quite stark, and functionality 
doctrine arose first from the latter field. Hence, excepting marks from 
functionality has some historical basis; but at the same time, doing so ignores 
the long-term trend towards unification of dress and marks overall—whether 
 
140 See infra Section II.B (discussing dilution and post-sale confusion in greater detail). 
141 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1986). 
142 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Dart, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 566, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
143 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006). 
144 Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 
145 Id. at 1068. 
146 See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters. 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981); Bos. Pro. 
Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir 1975). 
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statutory through the Lanham Act or theoretical.147 Moreover, there may be 
normative issues presented by cabining functionality doctrine in such a way, 
given the realities of the digital era. Professor Dan Burk argues, for example, 
that words and phrases like domain names, metatags, and search terms ought 
to be considered functional since they are computer-operational.148 Professor 
Alexandra Roberts makes a similar point against the registrability of certain 
hashtags—visible and recognizable to users, yet also clearly capable of 
“organizing content and facilitating search.”149 At a minimum, excepting word 
and symbol marks from functionality doctrine fails to fully solve the 
overinclusion problem of TrafFix’s stated test: all trade dress should still be 
invalid under its terms. 
One might instead seek refuge in the utilitarian-aesthetic distinction. The 
Court’s formulation of aesthetic functionality offers more of a limiting 
principle: “[W]e have observed that a functional feature is one the ‘exclusive 
use of [which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.’ . . . It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic functionality . . . .”150 The traditional 
search-cost and quality-incentive benefits of trademarks are clearly 
“reputation related,” after all. But then one is faced with the critical question 
of when the “non-reputation-related” rule for aesthetic functionality actually 
applies; as the Court emphasizes, “[w]here the design is functional under the 
[cost-quality-use-purpose] formulation there is no need to proceed further to 
consider if there is a competitive necessity . . . .”151 
One interpretation is that TrafFix effectively sets forth a two-stage test: 
first, a check for functionality via effects on the cost, quality, use, and purpose 
of the product; second, a check for functionality via non-reputation-related 
disadvantages for competitors. If the mark fails at stage one, it is utilitarian-
functional; if the mark fails at stage two, it is aesthetic-functional. On its face, 
the “proceed further” language of TrafFix seems to suggest this kind of 
approach. Note, though, that this interpretation means the term “aesthetic” 
acts largely as a label for the sake of convenience, rather than a term invested 
with much independent meaning. Some circuits appear to have adopted this 
semantic stance,152 which is equivalent to rejecting a meaningful aesthetic-
 
147 See supra Part I (outlining the historical development of functionality doctrine). 
148 See Burk, supra note 75, at 1385. 
149 See Roberts, supra note 75, at 626. 
150 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001) (emphasis added). 
151 Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
152 See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he test for functionality proceeds in two steps.”). 
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utilitarian distinction in all but name.153 For the same reason, observe that 
this interpretation fails to solve the problem of overinclusion at all—any mark 
should simply fail at the first, utilitarian stage for (at a minimum) its search-
cost and quality-incentive effects. The second, aesthetic stage of the test is 
never reached. 
Another reading of TrafFix is that the utilitarian-aesthetic distinction 
carries its own significance as an initial differentiator, even if it was left 
undefined by the Court. That is, product features are first sorted into either 
the “utilitarian” or “aesthetic” bucket, and only that bucket’s test for 
functionality applies. The Second Circuit, for example, restricts application 
of the non-reputation-related disadvantage inquiry to “ornamental 
features”—those that “do[] not serve a purpose in the design of a product.”154 
The Fifth Circuit still rejects aesthetic functionality (in the sense that 
anything sorted into the aesthetic bucket is automatically non-functional), 
but it likewise relies on the idea of ornamentation, anything above and 
beyond a product’s bare use: 
The school colors and other indicia used here do not make the t-shirts “work.” 
The t-shirts would function just as well as articles of clothing without the 
colors and designs . . . . [Defendant] contends that the shirts allow groups of 
people to bond and show support for a philosophy or goal; facilitate the 
expression of loyalty to the school . . . ; and identify the wearer as a fan . . . . 
These claimed functional uses are nothing more than the kind of aesthetic 
uses . . . [that our] circuit has consistently rejected . . . .155 
Even when a court does not explicitly state its basis for choosing the aesthetic 
bucket over the utilitarian one, the undercurrent is often the same: aesthetic 
features are “pure[] ornamenta[tion]”156 or matters of visual “appeal,”157 
contrasted against a product’s mechanical utility or tangible characteristics. 
This interpretation faces severe criticism from commentators in its own 
right, and scholars have sought to re-label or re-cast the doctrine in more 
 
153 See, e.g., Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(adopting the “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” test, but declining to label the 
inquiry as “aesthetic”); Hughes, supra note 129 at 1244 (“The Federal Circuit has also seemed hesitant 
to embrace the doctrine, although their hesitancy reads more like a terminological objection . . . .”); 
see also Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2012) (not 
deciding whether “we have even adopted aesthetic functionality doctrine at all,” but supporting the 
competitive disadvantage test and recognizing that, “regardless . . . , the outcome is the same”). 
154 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 214 & 
n.4 (2d Cir. 2012). 
155 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 
465, 486-87 (5th Cir. 2008). 
156 Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 641 (6th Cir. 2002). 
157 Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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straightforward ways.158 In particular, critics are quick to highlight the 
widespread demand for (and use of) supposedly ornamental trademarks in 
and of themselves.159 The example of conspicuous consumption given earlier 
is once again instructive. It would be willful blindness to insist that the 
fundamental purpose of, say, Burberry-print slacks is just to cover the human 
body’s lower half and avoid public indecency laws. The prominent display of 
Burberry’s most famous and iconic design is neither an afterthought nor 
abstract flourish—it is the raison d’être for producer and consumer alike. If 
“utilitarian” is to have any sensible meaning in the context of product design, 
it must surely include, at minimum, full consideration as to how the product 
is utilized. 
The utilitarian-aesthetic problem, in that sense, runs much deeper. Even 
without a famous or high-status mark, many products are purchased to be 
visually pleasant. In the case of decorative items like desk sculptures and 
throw pillows, it may be quite literally the only purpose of the item. And even 
when the other purposes of the item are significant, visual appeal can be an 
equally important precondition for buyers. Consider someone purchasing a 
car: there are any number of performance metrics like fuel efficiency or 
acceleration that are surely important, not least of which is the life-and-death 
matter of safety statistics on the road. And yet, amongst real-world 
consumers, color still dominates the purchasing calculus.160 Working 
backwards from these kinds of market incentives, any rational producer is 
keeping visual appeal no less in mind than raw, mechanical function. Put 
differently, relying on the aesthetic-utilitarian dichotomy means treating 
form and function as orthogonal—a position at odds with real consumer 
behavior, and long since rejected by actual professional designers.161 
 
158 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 129, at 1247 (“[T]he cases we call ‘aesthetic’ functionality are 
more properly understood as cognitive or psychological functionality.”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark 
P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 
2055, 2063 (2012) (distinguishing between “aesthetic and mechanical functionality”). 
159 See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 794-804 (2012) (discussing 
the logic of trademark law with respect to status goods); Beebe, supra note 138, at 814 (2010) 
(characterizing the purpose of intellectual property law as “to preserve and stabilize our modern 
sumptuary code”). 
160 See, e.g., Michelle Krebs, Moods of 5 Decades, Color by Color, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 1997) 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/16/automobiles/moods-of-5-decades-color-by-color.html 
[https://perma.cc/825V-G8CS] (“[N]early a third of those questioned said they would switch vehicle 
brands if they couldn’t get the color they wanted. In another survey, . . . nearly half the respondents 
said they would switch cars if they couldn’t find their first color choice.”); What Are the Best Car 
Colors to Buy?, KELLEY BLUE BOOK (July 18, 2019), https://www.kbb.com/articles/car-advice/what-
are-the-best-car-colors-to-buy [https://perma.cc/YB94-FW7E] (“It also follows that less popular 
colors depreciate your vehicle’s value . . . from hundreds to thousands of dollars . . . .”). 
161 The architect Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, famously stated that “form and function 
are one,” riffing on Louis Sullivan’s now-disfavored mantra of “form follows function.” Form Follows 
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A more satisfying, holistic, and accurate approach to functionality is to 
instead recognize the traditional search-cost and quality-incentive effects of 
trademarks as species within a larger genus of trademark benefits. That is: 
benefits that are incapable of being shared across producers. It is these fragile 
forms of what would otherwise be labeled functionality that appear to be 
tolerated (and even celebrated) in actual trademark jurisprudence. Observe 
that this reconceptualization neatly accommodates the traditional benefits of 
trademarks and conspicuous consumption habits alike. Coca-Cola’s stylized 
name mark affects the cost of its soda, insofar as it reduces search costs. The 
trademark also affects the quality of its soda, insofar as it incentivizes building 
a positive reputation with consumers. But Coca-Cola’s trademark will do 
neither of those things if multiple, unrelated soda manufacturers are free to 
use it. Likewise, Louis Vuitton’s V print trademark affects the use or purpose 
of an emblazoned purse, insofar as consumers want to conspicuously display 
wealth and differentiate themselves. The trademark, however, will clearly fail 
to do so if any purse manufacturer is free to use it—if not immediately, then 
shortly after the public catches on. 
These species of fragile functionality can be contrasted against a more 
prototypical, non-fragile example. Imagine a producer of countertop popcorn 
poppers seeks trademark protection for the particular shape of their poppers’ lids: 
 
Figure 1: Popcorn Popper Lid162 
The clear, angled lid may be distinct and recognizable to purchasing 
consumers, but it also impacts the product’s actual use: the clarity enables 




162 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., No. 85870582, at 2 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2016), 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-85870582-EXA-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9GT-Y58L] 
(explaining a dispute over the patent registration of a popcorn machine). 
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deflects popped kernels out of the machine and into the user’s preferred 
container, allowing for set-it-and-forget-it operation.163 These advantages, 
moreover, can be freely shared; if every competing manufacturer copied the 
same lid design, each individual popper machine would still allow users to 
watch the popping action or set up an adjacent bowl to be filled. The benefits 
of the lid shape are, in other words, non-fragile. Unsurprisingly, trademark 
protection was denied in this case, on the basis of functionality.164 
The major cases described thus far provide further examples. The superior 
wind resistance of MDI’s dual-spring sign design is not lessened in any way 
by other outdoor sign manufacturers copying it.165 Likewise, the lower 
production cost of Nabisco’s pillow-shaped biscuits is not somehow raised by 
other shredded wheat companies using an identical shape.166 In brief, when 
courts do label a product feature as ineligible for trademark protection due to 
functionality, it is on the basis of non-fragile—that is, freely shareable—
advantages. 
This fragility theory, moreover, links the concept of functionality back to 
genericness. As noted earlier, courts have long drawn parallels between 
generic names and symbols ineligible for trademark protection and “generic” 
(that is, functional) product features ineligible for trade dress protection. The 
connection between the two is more than superficial: generic names and 
symbols are functional, in the sense that they confer non-fragile benefits by 
way of reduced search costs. Specifically, the existence of a uniform, shared 
signifier allows producers to easily describe (and consumers to easily locate) 
the correct product or service in general. “Cellophane,”167 for example, 
efficiently and unambiguously communicates a certain class of products in a 
way that “transparent, regenerated cellulose sheets” never could. If a single 
producer were instead given exclusive control over the term, “[c]ompetitors 
would have difficulty informing consumers that they were competitors, 
because they would be unable, without elaborate and possibly confusing 
paraphrase, to give the name of the product they were selling.”168 So the 
benefit of a generic term is instead shared freely, to avoid “excessive costs of 
information on competitors and consumers” alike.169 
 
163 Id. at 11. 
164 Id. 
165 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 31-32 (2001). 
166 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938). 
167 See generally DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936) 
(“The course of conduct of the complainant and its predecessors, and especially complainant’s 
advertising campaign, tended to make cellophane a generic term descriptive of the product rather 
than of its origin and, in our opinion, made it so to at least a very large part of the trade.”). 
168 Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 171 (7th Cir. 1996). 
169 Id.; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 193-94 (2003) (“The negative effect on the supply of 
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The next section offers a series of real-world examples of fragile 
functionality. First and foremost, these examples serve as further evidence of 
TrafFix’s descriptive shortcomings, insofar as they are all valid trademarks. 
But the examples also serve as a demonstration of how widespread, diverse, 
and persistent—even inevitable—these kinds of functionalities are. 
Moreover, these examples serve to highlight and preview some of the 
consequences of protecting fragile functionalities, examined more directly in 
Part III. 
B. Fragile Functionalities 
1. Placebo Functionality 
Recall the experiment outlined in the introduction to this article. Test 
subjects taking the Nurofen-branded ibuprofen self-report greater pain relief 
and fewer side effects than the control group taking generic ibuprofen.170 This 
brand effect is so strong, moreover, that when the experiment is repeated—
with Nurofen-labeled placebos replacing the actual Nurofen—the result still 
holds.171 A sugar pill with a trademark is able to outperform the genuine, but 
unbranded, pharmaceutical.172 
Similar experiments consistently replicate the trademark-name advantage 
in the context of pain treatment,173 but the effect manifests broadly across 
consumer goods as well. Food marketing research in particular offers myriad 
demonstrations of the experience-enhancing power of trademarks. Subjects 
rate the taste of a well-known brand’s turkey slices as higher than identical 
slices given a fake, unknown brand name.174 Likewise for powdered drink 
mixes: comparing the results between blind and labeled taste-tests indicates 
that brand information often exerts a greater impact than the actual 
ingredients.175 Along similar lines, subjects rate the taste of Perrier as superior 
 
trademarks from denying protection to generic terms is slight and almost certainly outweighed by 
the benefits from pitching a trademark into the public domain when it becomes generic. For this 
reduces the costs of communication by making it cheaper for competitors of the (former) trademark 
owner to inform the consumer that they are selling the same product.”). 
170 Faasse et al., supra note 1, at 187. 
171 Id. 
172 For many of the examples in this subsection, the author is indebted to Professor Jake 
Linford’s compilation and analysis of research on the placebo effects of trademarks. See Jake Linford, 
Placebo Marks, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 45 (2019). 
173 See, e.g., A. Branthwaite & P. Cooper, Analgesic Effects of Branding in Treatment of Headaches, 
282 BRITISH MED. J. 1576 (1981). 
174 Makens, supra note 6, at 263. 
175 Varela et al., supra note 5, at 879 (finding well-known brand names to significantly improve 
tasting scores, but only when visible to the taster). 
2021] A Fragility Theory of Trademark Functionality  1859 
to “Old Fashioned Seltzer”—but only when the labels are showing.176 And 
subjects’ claimed preferences between beer brands can be softened, or even 
reversed, by removing the labels prior to taste-testing.177 Even Coca-Cola 
itself, perhaps one of the most recognizable and uniform tastes in the world, 
receives higher taste-test scores when explicitly labeled as such, rather than 
unidentified.178 
These examples rely on self-reported, subjective sensations like pain and 
taste. But the scientific literature is replete with examples where the 
trademark placebo effect is so powerful it goes beyond enhancing the 
consumers’ internal experience—it confers an externally verifiable advantage. 
Returning to medicine, in one such experiment, high blood–pressure patients 
were switched from Betaprol to either Novaprol or a generic.179 All drugs 
were, in fact, placebos, but the generic group presented with higher blood 
pressure and a greater incidence of side effects than the Novaprol group.180 
The patients did not merely feel different; their blood pressure as measured 
by physicians showed significant group–level differences. 
Likewise, the placebo effect of trademarks on consumer goods can 
measurably improve task completion. Subjects given a Nike–branded golf 
club require fewer strokes on average to sink a putt than subjects given an 
unbranded, but otherwise perfectly identical, club.181 Subjects given 3M–
branded earplugs achieve higher scores on a noise-disrupted math test than 
subjects given the same—though unlabeled—earplugs.182 The effect 
manifests even between similarly prominent marks, where one brand has a 
closer association with the task at hand: on cognition tests, subjects told that 
they are consuming Red Bull (“Silver Edition Lime”) outperform subjects 
told that they are consuming Sprite, regardless of which beverage they were 
actually given.183 
 
176 Jeffrey S. Nevid, Effects of Brand Labeling on Ratings of Product Quality, 53 PERCEPTUAL & 
MOTOR SKILLS 407, 409 (1981). 
177 Ralph I. Allison & Kenneth P. Uhl, Influence of Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception, 
1 J. MKTG. RSCH. 36, 39 (1964). 
178 Samuel M. McClure, Jian Li, Damon Tomlin, Kim S. Cypert, Latané M. Montague & P. 
Read Montague, Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 
379, 382, 385 (2004). 
179 Faasse et al., supra note 1, at 91. 
180 Id. at 91-93. 
181 Garvey et al., supra note 4, at 947. 
182 Id. at 939. 
183 Liane Schmidt, Pierre Chandon, Mathias Pessiglione & Hilke Plassmann, Red Bull Gives 
You Incentive Motivation: Understanding Placebo Effects of Energy Drinks on Human Cognitive 
Performance (INSEAD: The Bus. Sch. for the World, Working Paper Series 2017/04/MKT, 2017), 
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2017/01/03/097717.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRQ-
QYGK]. 
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Trademarks, in other words, are able to improve not only the consumer’s 
subjective impressions—from perceived pain relief to the caliber of taste—
but also objective metrics like blood pressure and test scores. In TrafFix terms, 
all of these marks clearly “affect[] the . . . quality of the article.”184 A generic 
ibuprofen would need to be substantially improved in other respects—greater 
bioavailability or an easier–to–swallow shape—just to reach the same level of 
total product quality as Nurofen. A no-name golf club would need better 
aerodynamics or grip control just to deliver the same results as an otherwise 
identical Nike club. And a new energy drink might require more active 
ingredients just to provide the same buzz as Red Bull. In that sense, all of the 
marks referenced in this section should theoretically be ineligible for 
protection on functionality grounds. 
At the same time, observe that the placebo effect relies on consumers’ 
mental associations with the underlying brand—and is therefore fragile. If the 
mark were used freely by all producers, it would cease to actually signify 
anything to the consumer. Hence, in the experiments described thus far, real 
trademarks outperform fake ones,185 and trademarks linked to task–relevant 
brand identities outperform task–irrelevant ones.186 The placebo effect 
demands authenticity; subjects using goods perceived as counterfeits perform 
more poorly on measured tasks.187 That performance reduction, moreover, 
persists even if the subjects are subsequently given the real deal—so, for 
example, a test-taker that previously used a “fake” Parker pen will still make 
more errors when given a “real” Parker pen than control test–takers.188 In 
short, the quality enhancement associated with placebo functionality largely 
cannot be shared without dissipating. And because the placebo effect is 
fragile, it does not trigger ineligibility under functionality doctrine. 
2. Social Functionality 
Consider again a hypothetical consumer’s decision to purchase an 
expensive fashion item—say, a Louis Vuitton briefcase, complete with the 
trademarked V print emblazoned on all sides. Doubtless, the print enables the 
 
184 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. 
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1994)). 
185 See, e.g., supra notes 174-176. 
186 See, e.g., Schmidt et al., supra note 183; see also Garvey et al., supra note 4, at 943 (finding 
that “Nike” golf club users required significantly fewer strokes to sink varying putts than identical 
“Gucci” golf club users). 
187 Moty Amar, Dan Ariely, Ziv Carmon & Haiyang Yang, How Counterfeits Infect Genuine 
Products: The Role of Moral Disgust, 28 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 329 (2018); see also Linford, supra note 
172, at 72 (“[E]xperiments suggest that this performance enhancing effect might be reduced or 
eliminated if consumers encounter counterfeit goods imitating high-performance branded goods.”). 
188 Amar et al., supra note 187, at 334, 336-37. 
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consumer to more quickly locate the intended, authentic product to buy. And 
some consumers may find the briefcase more attractive, regardless of the 
print’s latent “Louis Vuitton” meaning, simply due to the print’s visual 
design. Either way, the briefcase’s print carries a social meaning: it signals 
attributes about the consumer to other observers. That is, while wearing the 
briefcase, the consumer is viewed (at least, by some) as more wealthy, high–
status, and fashionable. A socially aware consumer knows this and 
deliberately courts it; their purchasing decision is strongly informed by that 
outcome in the first place. In that sense, the social effect of the mark is a key 
part of the briefcase’s use. This is why the consumer is willing to pay a 
premium on the briefcase in significant excess of its intrinsic, pre–social 
qualities (such as its materials, durability, or visual appeal). 
In short: “firms produce trademarks as status goods, [and] consumers 
consume trademarks to signal status.”189 Economic models from as early as 
the 19th century recognize and attempt to capture this phenomenon of 
status–signaling consumption,190 and real-world data tends to confirm its 
existence empirically. For example, take the market for purses: status-seeking 
consumers are significantly more likely to rank “conspicuously” branded 
items as more valuable than “inconspicuously” branded ones from the same 
producer; they are also more likely to choose the conspicuous option among 
two purses of otherwise identical price and value.191 Likewise, in the world of 
makeup, price is a much stronger determinant of demand for makeup 
products that are brand–invisible (e.g., a facial cleanser applied at home) than 
it is for makeup products that are brand–visible (e.g., a lipstick tube that might 
be taken out and reapplied in public).192 That is, consumers are much less 
dissuaded by high prices if they know they might get to show off the purchase 
in public. Even the world of banking is not immune: an analysis of credit card 
transaction data, for example, showed that elite-status cards are significantly 
more likely to be used in brand-visible contexts (e.g., restaurants, bars, and 
clubs, where the card is physically shown to nearby patrons and staff).193 
 
189 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004). 
190 See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC 
STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (2d. ed. 1912). For more recent economic work offering a generalized 
theory and model of status–signaling consumption, see Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas 
Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1996). 
191 Young Jee Han, Joseph C. Nunes & Xavier Drèze, Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The 
Role of Brand Prominence, 74 J. MKTG. 15, 24-25 (2010). 
192 See, e.g., Angela Chao & Juliet B. Schor, Empirical Tests of Status Consumption: Evidence from 
Women’s Cosmetics, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107, 117 (1998). 
193 Leonardo Bursztyn, Bruno Ferman, Stefano Fiorin, Martin Kanz & Gautam Rao, Status 
Goods: Experimental Evidence from Platinum Credit Cards 133 Q.J. ECON. 1561, 1564, 1573-74, 1593 
(2018). 
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The examples thus far revolve around luxury, exclusive goods, but socially 
conspicuous trademarks vary considerably. As economists, sociologists, and 
pundits alike have long recognized, demonstrations of charity can have much 
the same status-enhancing effect as outright demonstrations of wealth—
philanthropic activity is not always an entirely selfless act.194 “Immodest 
alms-giving may be as old as humanity—consider the tale of Jesus rebuking 
the self-exalting Pharisee—but it has flowered spectacularly of recent,”195 and 
taken on a particularly marks-based model, from small looped ribbons on 
lapels to attire that is charity- or activist-branded outright.196 
With that in mind, consider the trademark for Product Red, a brand that 
partners with consumer-facing companies to fund HIV/AIDS projects.197 
These companies (such as Beats Electronics) will sell a separate version of 
their existing product (such as Beats headphones) with the (PRODUCT) 
mark and distinct scarlet color198 to enhance the product’s popularity. In 
exchange, a portion of the sale goes back to Product Red as royalty, to fund 
its humanitarian efforts.199 Or consider TOMS shoes—a company well 
known for its philanthropic activities, including investing one-third of all 
profits in grassroots organizations and causes.200 The shoes themselves have a 
recognizable espadrille design, in addition to the trademarked (and readily 
visible) TOMS tags and logos. When customers wear Product Red 
headphones or TOMS shoes in public, they use not only the good’s intrinsic 
features—its ability to play music or protect one’s feet—but also the 
communicative function mediated by the good’s conspicuous marks. That is, 
 
194 See, e.g., STEVE DUCK, RETHINKING RELATIONSHIPS 162 (2011) (“Conspicuous 
consumption may thus take the form of conspicuous giving, and although it may be an excellent 
outcome for the recipients, the main point for the giver is that you are seen to be a giver or a 
consumer, even if the effect is ultimately helpful.”); Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling 
Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1020-21 (1996) (“The data on charitable giving 
support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to 
aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status.”); cf. Margrit Talpalaru, Blake Mycoskie, 
TOMS, and Life Narratives of Conspicuous Giving, 37 BIOGRAPHY 168, 170 (2014) (“Conspicuous 
giving, then, has less to do with narrowing the income gap, eradicating world hunger, and curing 
cancer, than it has with providing corporations a way to determine and sanction the right way of 
behaving and participating within the system.”). 
195 PATRICK WEST, CONSPICUOUS COMPASSION: WHY SOMETIMES IT REALLY IS CRUEL 
TO BE KIND 1-3 (2004). 
196 See, e.g., Black Lives Matter: The Official Store, BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
https://store.blacklivesmatter.com [https://perma.cc/4BL9-XTNS]. 
197 How (Red) Works, (RED), https://www.red.org/how-red-works [https://perma.cc/EE9Z-W2M8]. 
198 See, e.g., (Beats)Red Products, (RED), https://www.red.org/products/beats [https://perma.cc/5FDU-
JH7S] (selling Product Red Beats Solo 3 Wireless Headphones for $299.95). 
199 How (Red) Works, supra note 197. 
200 1/3 of Profits for Grassroots Good, TOMS, https://www.toms.com/us/impact.html 
[https://perma.cc/4KVP-3544] (outlining the various ways that TOMS has donated its proceeds to 
different causes, from COVID-19 funds to mental health organizations). 
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the marks are used to project desirable attributes in a social context: I am 
charitable; I am socially conscious; I am a good person. Without the trademarks, 
these goods cannot accomplish that same projection, and so their additional 
function would largely disappear. 
These trademarks are “essential to the use or purpose” of the underlying 
products.201 For some extreme consumers, this essentiality reaches the level 
of a necessary condition for purchase; a Louis Vuitton briefcase with no 
externally recognizable markings, labels, or prints may be able to fulfill a 
number of uses (it can, of course, still hold papers), but it simply will not 
substitute for the purposes of a status seeker. Either way, the observational 
and experimental data cited above suggests that even average consumers find 
the potential social signals of products just as important as their intrinsic, 
tangible qualities. It is difficult, then, to ignore these social uses as somehow 
non-essential—they are a form of functionality under the terms of TrafFix. 
The “purpose” language in particular seems to easily capture the examples of 
conspicuous charity. What is the purpose of a pair of (PRODUCT) 
headphones? An answer that does not include “advancing the cause against 
HIV/AIDs” is obviously incomplete. The product would not exist, but for 
that goal. And the headphones only fulfill that purpose through Product Red’s 
trademark licensing regime. 
Just like the placebo effect, however, the social effects of marks are fragile. 
The public’s association between the mark and the underlying brand is part 
and parcel of the credible social signal. If that association were undermined 
through open use of the mark, the social signal would cease to be meaningful. 
When any company is free to use the Project Red logo or color without 
funding humanitarian projects—perhaps even engaging in irresponsible 
activities themselves with respect to labor, environmental impact, and so on—
then even authentic Project Red apparel conveys very little to observers about 
the wearer’s charitability. Likewise, when any company is free to use Louis 
Vuitton’s signature prints on their more affordable briefcases, then briefcases 
bearing those prints will no longer convey wealth or prestige to nearly the 
same degree. And because the social functionality of these marks cannot be 
shared without degrading—that is, because it is fragile—it does not lead to 
trademark ineligibility. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONALITY 
Certification marks provide another set of cost-reduction examples—
examples that run afoul of a facial reading of TrafFix. These marks are used 
to indicate a product’s “regional or other origin, material, mode of 
 
201 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
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manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics.”202 In practice, a third-
party organization typically controls licensing for the mark, and sets forth 
certain benchmarks or regulations that must be met for a company to use the 
mark on its products. For example, the USB Implementers Forum controls 
various marks indicating USB compatibility:203 
 
Figure 2: Example of USB Compatibility Mark204 
 
An electronics company that wants to license these marks for its product 
or packaging must first pass testing from USB-IF to ensure interoperability 
with the USB technology (and, for some SUPERSPEED marks, specific data 
transfer rates).205 Another common example is certification marks for 
geographic origin—consider the following marks owned by Napa Valley 





202 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (“[C]ertification marks . . . shall be registrable 
under this chapter, in the same manner and with the same effect as are trademarks . . . . Applications 
and procedure under this section shall conform as nearly as practicable to those prescribed for the 
registration of trademarks.”). 
203 See USB-IF Licensed Mark(s) Requirements, USB, https://www.usb.org/sites/default/files/ 
trademark_license_agreement_licensed_mark_requirements_final_as_of_november_30_2018_locke
d_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNX2-5JU7] (last updated Nov. 30, 2018) (displaying the various marks 
permitted to show USB compatibility). 
204 SUPERSPEED CERTIFIED USB, Registration No. 3,894,350. 
205 USB-IF Logo License, USB, https://www.usb.org/logo-license [https://perma.cc/EJ8B-
LF2J]; see also USB-IF Trademark License Agreement, USB, 
https://www.usb.org/sites/default/files/trademark_license_agreement_fall_2018_clean_final_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BP9U-B3XA] (describing USB-IF’s “Test Procedure”). 
206 See NVV Wins Certification Mark for Napa Valley, NAPA VALLEY VINTNERS (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://napavintners.com/press/press_release_detail.asp?ID_News=3621434 
[https://perma.cc/EG8Y-VWGU] (reporting that the Napa Valley Vintners obtained a certification 
mark for the name “Napa Valley”). 
207 See Certification Marks, IDAHO POTATO COMM’N, 
https://idahopotato.com/licensing/certification-marks [https://perma.cc/M5WY-WPC9] (listing 
certification marks of the Idaho Potato Commission). 
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Figure 3: Napa Valley Vintners208 and the Idaho Potato Commission209 
Marks 
    
These organizations exclusively license their marks to companies that 
produce wine and potatoes within their respective territories. 
Both archetypes offer significant cost reductions to producers on at least 
two levels. First and foremost, they enable producers to cheaply (but reliably) 
convey certain product attributes. With a third party certifying, say, USB data 
transfer speed, there is less of a need for any one USB product manufacturer 
to invest in its own product demonstrations, in-store testing, return 
guarantees, or trial periods. Those costs are essentially externalized to the 
third party that manages testing. Likewise, for geographic origin, vintners are 
free to spend less money on websites, documentation, and advertising proving 
their connection to Napa’s historic wine scene—the well-policed mark does 
all the work for them. 
Second, these marks reduce the costs of interfirm coordination and 
cooperation. Take the Idaho Potato Commission, for example. In addition to 
managing its various marks, the Commission invests in significant advertising 
(both television and print), lobbying, and even industrial research activity.210 
 
208 The mark consists of the letter “N” embedded within four contiguous circles, Registration 
No. 2,985,207. 
209 CERTIFIED GENUINE IDAHO POTATOES GROWN IN IDAHO, Registration 
No. 4,221,402. 
210 About Idaho® Potatoes, IDAHO POTATO COMM’N, https://idahopotato.com/IdahoPotatoes 
[https://perma.cc/YSR6-XUHE] (“The funds generated . . . are used to advertise, promote, and do 
research . . . .”); see, e.g., They Sell Themselves, But . . .!, IDAHO POTATO COMM’N, 
https://idahopotato.com/retail/advertising [https://perma.cc/Y64N-JYEL] (describing advertising 
strategies used by the Idaho Potato Commission (IPC)); Helpful Downloads (old), IDAHO POTATO 
COMM’N, https://idahopotato.com/industry/helpful-downloads3 [https://perma.cc/PF8H-CCH6] 
(describing marketing strategies used by the IPC ); Maya Rhodan, The Potato Lobby Wants in on 
WIC, TIME (Jan. 9, 2014), http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/09/the-potato-lobby-wants-in-on-
wic/ [https://perma.cc/2LD5-89QR] (naming the Idaho Potato Commission as “one of the many 
industry groups lobbying” for expanded food-stamp eligibility for white potatoes). 
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Napa Valley Vintners engages in similar efforts.211 Certification marks 
provide a convenient mechanism to promote buy-in and reduce the free-
riding that might otherwise occur from these efforts. When “Idaho potatoes” 
or “Napa Valley wine” is promoted, every producer in the region stands to 
benefit, whether they contributed to those efforts or not. By creating a single, 
recognizable mark for these classes of products, there can be some degree of 
forced contribution: licensing fees fund industry-level activities, and 
producers that fail to buy in are at a comparative disadvantage in the 
marketplace without the mark.212 The potential savings with regards to 
industrial organization are considerable. 
Again, in TrafFix terms, all of these marks clearly “affect[] the cost . . . of 
the article.”213 Their underlying products are, effectively, cheaper to produce 
than they would be in a world without the mark and, hence, should 
theoretically be ineligible for protection on functionality grounds. But at the 
same time, the nature of these cost-advantage mechanisms means that they 
are not capable of being freely shared. If producers are free to erroneously 
certify USB compatibility or Napa Valley terroir, then the certification is no 
longer a credible signal to consumers. In turn, this means producers will have 
to return to more costly ways of conveying their product attributes. Likewise, 
if any producer can free-ride on the efforts of the rest of the industry or 
region, then there will be little buy-in on any efficient cooperation. Because 
these functions of certification marks are fragile, they do not constitute actual 
barriers to trademark eligibility. 
IV. DESIGN FUNCTIONALITY 
Consider a particular shape of lighter: 
 
 
211 Industry Advocacy, NAPA VALLEY VINTNERS, 
https://napavintners.com/about/industry_advocacy.asp [https://perma.cc/L6PP-UHXJ] (“[W]e 
advocate on behalf of our members on all relevant issues and at all levels of government: local, state, 
federal, and even internationally.”). 
212 Indeed, if the mark is sufficiently prominent, it’s likely that consumers will not believe a 
product’s claimed origin without it. They may see a bottle of wine that says in plain text “Napa, 
California,” compare it to the many others bearing official Napa Valley Vintner marks, and assume 
the former is capitalizing on some technicality at best (e.g., the vineyard is within the legal 
boundaries of Napa County, but on inferior, non-historic land). 
213 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
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Figure 4: Lighter Shape Trademarked by Zippo214 
 
Zippo® holds a trademark on this lighter shape.215 By making the shape 
itself the signifier, Zippo is able to introduce considerable variation in the 
designs of its lighters—even incorporating other brands—without reducing 
their immediate recognizability: 
 
Figure 5: Example of Zippo Lighter Incorporating the Jack Daniels 
Brand216 
 
The shape trademark, in other words, allows Zippo to create novel and 
intricately designed lighters without the need to keep the word “Zippo” writ 
large on the product body. Absent the shape trademark, Zippo would need to 
either spend more on advertising and packaging, incur workaround design 
 
214 The drawing shows a lighter having slightly rounded edges and corners, and a curvature in 
the shape of a slight arc in the top of the lighter, Registration No. 2,606,241. 
215 Id. 
216 Zippo Lighter, STOCKVAULT (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.stockvault.net/photo/192273/zippo-
lighter [https://perma.cc/X28M-L9EQ]. 
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costs, or offer fewer options in order to achieve the same level of brand 
prominence. 
The popular Funko® toy brand exhibits a similar dynamic. The base doll 
shapes are trademarked,217 and readily recognized in the figurine community: 
 
Figure 6: Doll Shape Trademarked by Funko®218 
   
Funko licenses characters from a variety of companies for its dolls, from 
Marvel to Pokemon.219 And by protecting and maintaining the doll style 
itself, Funko is always able to retain its own brand recognition—without the 
need for any additional tags, labels, or accessories: 
 
Figure 7: Pokemon doll in the Distinctive Funko Style220 
 
217 The mark consists of a three-dimensional configuration of a full length figure featuring an 
over-sized head, wide-spaced eyes, and a proportionally shortened and narrowed body, Registration 
No. 5,333,118; The mark consists of a three-dimensional configuration of a full length figure featuring 
an over-sized head, wide-spaced eyes, and a proportionally shortened and narrowed body, 
Registration No. 5,333,117. 
218 See trademarks cited supra note 217. 
219 See Shop Marvel, FUNKO, https://www.funko.com/shop-marvel [https://perma.cc/NW84-
FQKB] (selling Marvel-themed Funko dolls); Shop Pokemon, FUNKO, https://www.funko.com/shop-
pokemon [https://perma.cc/6KSJ-XBNZ] (selling Pokemon-themed Funko dolls). 
220 Pop Funko Pokemon Toy Karakara Cubone Masterball, PIXABAY (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://pixabay.com/photos/pop-funko-pokemon-toy-karakara-5475390/ [https://perma.cc/P7XS-HJZP]. 
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This approach may be contrasted in particular against an older, 
significantly popular toy line: Beanie Babies. The primary feature ensuring 
their brand recognizability was a separately attached, heart-shaped Ty® tag—
which incurred its own additional manufacturing costs above and beyond that 
of the product itself.221 The tag could also be removed after purchase, 
reducing brand visibility (and resale value) in a way that cannot comparably 
be done with a Zippo lighter or the shape of a Funko doll. 
As a result of their trademarks, these companies are thus able to more 
cheaply make a greater diversity of products. In that sense, product “cost” is 
being “affect[ed]”222—and so too is product quality. The quality 
enhancements offered by unobtrusive branding may be relatively small, such 
as the elimination of an annoying-to-remove label sticker or a hole-creating 
punch tag. But they may also be more considerable, as in the case of products 
intended to be on display. In a countertrend to the conspicuous consumption 
and giving mentioned earlier, there are at least some consumers that 
deliberately avoid highly visible logos223 to embrace a minimalist aesthetic, to 
comport with an anti-capitalist ideology, or perhaps to simply avoid feeling 
like a walking billboard. A producer that can simultaneously accommodate 
those desires while not losing true recognizability is at a distinct advantage. 
But concurrently, the benefits of these marks are fragile; they depend 
upon the ability to restrict usage. If the distinct shapes of Zippo lighters and 
Funko dolls were free for all producers to use, the immediate recognizability 
of those particular brands would be lost. Relying on alternative forms of 
branding—or greater advertising, or design-around solutions—may be more 
costly, with the end product potentially less desirable to consumers. 
Accordingly, this kind of functionality is tolerated, and does not actually 
prevent trademark eligibility in practice. 
V. INTERLOCKING FUNCTIONALITY 
Trademarked features can affect the interoperability of certain products 
and, as a result, reduce the costs of controlling complementary markets. For 
 
221 Beanie Babies, TY, https://shop.ty.com/catalog/beanie-babies [https://perma.cc/B9W6-M2SL]. 
222 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001). 
223 See, e.g., “Un-Branded” . . . How Consumers Outgrew Traditional Branding, THE FASHION L. 
(May 17, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/un-branded-your-reliance-on-traditional-branding-
is-old-news-friends [https://perma.cc/UNG9-X8SH] (describing how some brands have shifted 
toward less-branded products); Ashley Lutz, Goldman Sachs Polled Hundreds of College-age Women on 
Their Favorite Clothing Brands, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-college-fashionista-survey-2015-12 
[https://perma.cc/2RZN-QZ67] (“[T]een and young-adult consumers . . . . increasingly prefer 
clothing without labels or logos.”). 
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example, the Lego Group holds trademarks on the particular shape of its basic 
building block unit (“brick”),224 as well as the design of its toy persons225: 
 




As a result of both trademarks, it is substantially more difficult for 
competitor toy companies to create products that are compatible with existing 
Lego sets.227 For the brick shape in particular, the mark explicitly includes its 
interlocking mechanism of pegs and sockets. For the Lego people, every 
feature is scaled and shaped to suit countless Lego objects: hats and hair both 
snap on to the head’s peg and conform to its cylindrical curvature; accessories 
socket into the C-shaped hands; and chairs rely on the legs’ holes and position 
relative to the remainder of the body.228 Competitors trying to make their 
products equally compatible with Lego items would need to design around 
 
224 The mark consists of a three dimensional rectangular solid brick shape with two rows of 
four cylindrical projections or studs on the upper surface, which is the configuration of the goods, 
Registration No. 4,222,057. 
225 The mark consists of the three-dimensional configuration of a toy figure featuring a 
cylindrical head, on top of a cylindrical neck, on top of a trapezoidal torso of uniform thickness, 
with flat sides and a flat back, where arms are mounted slightly below the upper surface of the torso, 
on top of a rectangular plate, on top of legs which bulge frontwards at the top and are otherwise 
rectangular with uniform thickness, on top of flat square feet, Registration No. 4,903,968. 
226 See trademarks cited supra notes 224-25. 
227 Indeed, Lego’s parallel EU trademark on the brick shape was rejected on precisely such 
grounds. See Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2010 
E.C.R. I-8403, ¶ 73 (“[T]he most important element of the sign composed of the Lego brick consists 
in the two rows of studs . . . . [which are] necessary to obtain the intended technical result 
of . . . assembly . . . .”). 
228 THE LEGO GRP., A SHORT PRESENTATION (2018), 
https://www.lego.com/cdn/cs/aboutus/assets/blt2278c7a21e58e900/LEGOCompanyProfile_2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZ9E-D4XZ]. 
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these marks while still trying to incorporate all relevant mechanical features. 
Naturally, this is a delicate tightrope to walk—one risking the considerable 
damages of a trademark infringement judgment and the loss of any sunk costs 
in manufacturing, design, and advertising up to that point. 
Comparable mechanisms for policing downstream product markets are 
considerably more expensive to implement. By way of contrast, consider the 
approach that Keurig adopted for its coffee pods and brewers. The success of 
their original line of brewers led to a robust market for cheap, unlicensed 
third-party pods. In response, the “Keurig 2.0” line of brewers, released in 
2014, included infrared scanners in its pod compartment; the device would 
refuse to brew unless an officially licensed Keurig pod, stamped with a 
particular reflective ink, was used.229 
Keurig ultimately abandoned its particular system due to consumer 
backlash,230 but that system is far from unique today. HP and Epson, for 
example, both include technology in their computer printers to reject third-
party (or original, but third-party-refilled) ink cartridges.231 Nintendo, along 
with the other major video game console manufacturers, uses software and 
hardware alike to prevent unlicensed or pirated game cartridges from working 
with its consoles.232 Where cheap, trademarked features instead control 
compatibility, the cost savings are potentially substantial. But, as with the 
other examples in this Section, the cost reduction is fragile—it is lost if all 
producers are able to freely use the mark. Without control over the brick- and 
person-shape marks, Lego no longer cheaply controls the market for 
interoperable products. Alternative measures are likely much more costly; 
imagine a potential “Lego 2.0,” featuring RFID verification between 
electromagnetic blocks. 
 
229 See Annie Gasparro, Keurig Stumbles with New K-Cup Brewer, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 
7:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/keurig-warns-currency-to-hurt-full-year-results-1423087615 
[https://perma.cc/J4GF-EKKF] (describing how the Keurig 2.0 was designed to be incompatible 
with pods made by other companies that do not carry the Keurig seal on the box). 
230 See Brian Barrett, Keurig’s My K-Cup Retreat Shows We Can Beat DRM, WIRED (May 8, 
2015, 9:15 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/keurig-k-cup-drm [https://perma.cc/9AL3-WF6E] 
(describing a drop in sales from the Keurig 2.0 and Keurig’s subsequent shift back to allowing non-
Keurig pods). 
231 See Cory Doctorow, EFF to Texas AG: Epson Tricked Its Customers with a Dangerous Fake 
Update, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/eff-texas-
ag-epson-tricked-its-customers-dangerous-fake-update [https://perma.cc/UZG4-AF69] (describing 
how printer companies now incorporate technological measures that reject ink that does not 
originate directly from the manufacturer). 
232 Cf. Joseph Cox, Nintendo Sues Californian for Selling Modded NES Classic and Switch Hacks, 
VICE MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 13, 2018, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/8xpekz/nintendo-sues-switch-modded-nes-classic-pirate-
californian [https://perma.cc/N8D3-75VB] (describing a lawsuit filed by Nintendo against an 
individual who had modified hardware and pirated games). 
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There are, of course, less extreme versions of this interlocking 
functionality. Consider a consumer that simply wants certain items to visually 
match, or to complete a set. In those circumstances, trademarked prints, 
colors, and logos help determine quality in the sense of suitability. For 
example, one might want to color-coordinate their earrings with a necklace; 
if the earrings are in trademark Tiffany Blue,233 then a matching necklace will 
only be found at Tiffany & Co. as well. The color is doing far more than 
merely indicating source or origin—it is precisely what enables the necklace 
to fulfill the consumer’s need. 
For a similar phenomenon, consider the trend of matching logos 
throughout an outfit—say, an all-Nike or all-Adidas ensemble. In such cases, 
items with a different logo or symbol will clearly not be compatible.234 Nor is 
this effect limited to fashion and jewelry; courts have recognized, for example, 
that tractor owners quite strongly prefer their attached equipment to 
match.235 If the tractor is John Deere Green-and-Yellow,236 then the tractor 
owner can only go to John Deere for a thresher in the same color scheme.237 
And because of the tractor owner’s preference for a match, the thresher’s 
colors will affect its quality from their perspective. 
But if these color and symbol marks were not protected, the original 
producers would not be using them consistently in the first place—such that 
 
233 The mark consists of a shade of blue often referred to as robin’s-egg blue which is used on 
boxes. The matter shown in broken lines represents boxes of various sizes and serves to show 
positioning of the mark. No claim is made to shape of the boxes, Registration No. 2,359,351. 
234 To wit, men’s fashion magazine GQ explicitly cautions its readers not to mix Nike and 
Adidas in particular as a major faux pas—as well as mentioning the danger of too many non-
matching logos in general. Skylar Bergl, The 6 Logo Mixing Commandments You Need to Know, GQ 
MAG. (July 27, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/how-to-mix-logos-in-the-same-outfit-nike-adidas 
[https://perma.cc/VS27-2MJS]. 
235 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 91 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (“There was 
abundant evidence at trial to the effect that farmers desire to ‘match’ their loaders to their 
tractors. . . . [G]enerally, farmers are concerned with the aesthetics of their farm machinery and 
prefer to match their loader to their tractor.”). 
236 See, e.g., The mark consists of a green vehicle body or frame with yellow wheels . . . . The 
drawing is lined for a bright green color, sometimes known as “John Deere” green, and a bright 
yellow color, and claim is made for such colors, Registration No. 1,502,103; The drawing is lined for 
a bright green color, and a bright yellow color, and claim is made for such colors, Registration No. 
1,503,576; The color(s) green and yellow is/are claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists 
of the color combination green and yellow in which green is applied to an exterior surface of the 
machine and yellow is applied to the wheels, Registration No. 3,857,095. 
237 See Deere & Co. v. FIMCO, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 964, 999-1003 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (finding 
John Deere’s color trademark valid, non-functional, and infringed by FIMCO). The district court 
in Farmhand reached a different result—finding John Deere’s color mark aesthetically functional. 
Farmhand, 560 F. Supp. at 98. Because that case precedes the entirety of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on functionality (save the Kellogg shredded wheat case), including especially Qualitex 
and TrafFix, it carries little descriptive significance or weight today. FIMCO, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 999-
1002 (“[T]his thirty-five year old decision was rendered long before the Supreme Court addressed 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine in Qualitex . . . and Trafix . . . .”). 
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their match-value would disappear. John Deere Green-and-Yellow provides 
no advantage in matching with John Deere equipment when that equipment 
is a different color in the first place (or multiple, inconsistent colors across 
products). The effects these marks have on quality for match-conscious 
consumers are therefore fragile, in the same way as the other examples 
throughout this section. In that sense, this phenomenon may be contrasted 
directly against the commonly cited Brunswick case—in which the PTO found 
the color black to be functional for outboard boat motors.238 As the PTO 
explained: “[B]lack is more desirable . . . because it is color compatible with 
a wider variety of boat colors and because objects colored black appear smaller 
than they do when they are painted other lighter or brighter colors.”239 These 
quality effects did trigger the bar of functionality, but observe that they are 
clearly non-fragile. The optical illusion of black objects appearing smaller does 
not depend upon trademark exclusivity, and neither does black’s universal 
color compatibility. If all producers of boat motors offered the color black as 
an option, these beneficial effects on quality would still persist. 
VI. REFORMULATING THE LAW 
The examples presented in the previous section—from pharmaceuticals 
to farm equipment—share much in common despite their variety. These 
marks all run afoul of the stated functionality test in TrafFix, as they 
demonstrably impact the underlying products’ cost, quality, use, or purpose. 
They are all, nevertheless, live trademarks in no apparent danger of 
invalidation. The reason for their viability appears to be another characteristic 
that they share: the effects that these marks exhibit on goods cannot be freely 
shared across producers. That is, the benefits and advantages are fragile—
they would be destroyed through unrestricted use of the mark at issue. 
To reiterate, this fragility is also found in the traditional, recognized, and 
celebrated functions of trademarks: search-cost reduction and quality-
reputation incentives. If every beverage manufacturer is free to use the Coca-
Cola logo, it will be considerably more costly for consumers to successfully 
locate the real deal. Likewise, Coca-Cola’s incentive to build up a positive 
reputation by investing in quality will largely vanish due to free-riding 
imposters. The logo’s effects on cost and quality are thus predicated on 
trademark protection in the first place—and so functionality doctrine does 
not bar validity. 
At a minimum, then, it is a descriptive improvement to rewrite the test 
for functionality as follows: In general terms, a product feature is functional, 
 
238 British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (T.T.A.B. 1993). 
239 Id. at 1199. 
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and cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost of quality of the article. Any use, purpose, or effect 
that is dependent on trademark exclusivity itself, however, will not be considered. 
Observe that, in a mixed case—a product feature that exhibits both fragile 
and non-fragile effects—trademark protection would not be permitted. The 
fragile effects would be ignored, but the non-fragile effects would remain to 
trigger the test. This is analogous to the Supreme Court’s longstanding 
holding that secondary meaning (that is, proof that the mark exhibits search-
cost and quality-incentive functions) does not save a mark that is functional 
for other reasons as well: “The Lanham Act . . . does not protect trade dress 
in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to 
encourage the public to associate [it] with a single manufacturer or seller.”240 
On the whole, this reformulation more accurately reflects the apparent 
tolerance of marks that otherwise clearly violate the text of TrafFix, from the 
traditional functions shared by all trademarks to the more unusual and 
context-specific examples presented in the previous Section. 
Re-casting the test for functionality in this way also comports with the 
full history and purpose of the doctrine. Recall the themes outlined in Part I, 
reiterated throughout the Supreme Court’s century-plus of jurisprudence on 
the matter: a preference for bright-line heuristics, a focus on welfare 
maximization, and an understanding of marks and dress as conceptually 
unified. Although a fuller analysis is reserved for the next Part, the fragility 
test for functionality does appear optimized to work as a welfare-enhancing 
heuristic. Any product improvements that can be shared are not afforded 
protection, ensuring that they are spread as widely as possible; it is only the 
improvements that could not be shared anyway that will receive trademark 
exclusivity. And because mixed cases lead to invalidity, producers will be 
encouraged to focus their branding efforts on features without preexisting, 
non-fragile functionality. Finally, unlike the original test of TrafFix, this 
reformulation is capable of being applied universally to marks and dress alike, 
sensibly and without the aforementioned issues of overinclusion. As noted 
earlier, it is capable of taking over identically for the other major bar to 
trademark protection: genericness. Observe in particular the parallel for 
mixed cases under current doctrine: generic marks, like other marks with non-
fragile functionality, cannot be saved by demonstrating the fragile 
functionality of secondary meaning.241 
 
240 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001). 
241 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d. Cir. 1976) 
(“This means that even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some ‘merely descriptive’ 
marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark.”). 
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The fragility test for functionality should also satisfy those who are rightly 
suspicious of extending trademark protection to inventions that are eligible 
for utility patents. The Court itself rejected true mutual exclusivity between 
the two fields,242 but nevertheless recognized a strong presumption against 
overlap in most cases: “Where the expired patent claimed the features in 
question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the 
heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by 
showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the 
device.”243 The same result holds under the fragility test for functionality. 
Patentable improvements are non-fragile by definition; to obtain a patent, an 
inventor needs to enable replication by others with ordinary skill in the art.244 
So unless the patented feature is being used on the product for reasons wholly 
irrelevant to that improvement—as pure ornamentation or arbitrary 
flourish—it will of course affect the cost, quality, use, or purpose of the 
product, and trademark protection will not issue. In other words, the fragility 
test for functionality retains the channeling ability of the doctrine (and its 
benefits, often discussed in the intellectual property literature writ large).245 
Re-orienting around the concept of fragility likewise allows for dispensing 
with the distinction between aesthetic and utilitarian functionality—a 
distinction only half-embraced and half-rejected by the Supreme Court and 
circuit courts alike in the first place.246 In particular, line-drawing between 
aesthetic and utilitarian features (to the extent it could ever have been 
 
242 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30. 
243 Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added). 
244 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification [of the patent application] shall . . . enable any 
person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same . . . invention.”); Matthew G. Sipe, Patent 
Law’s Philosophical Fault Line, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (2019) (“Enablement [a requirement of 
patentability] is, in other words, about replicability.”). 
245 See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
873, 884-90 (2009) (“Is it a problem that different modes of intellectual property protection can 
serve as alternative appropriation mechanisms? In my view it is . . . .”); Christopher Buccafusco, 
Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75, 120 (2018) (“[T]rade dress 
protection, once obtained, can last forever. Accordingly, if designers are ever able to sneak functional 
elements past trade dress law’s functionality screen, they can obtain rights that significantly hinder 
competition and innovation.”); cf. Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICHMOND 
L. REV. 611, 615 (2014) (“[T]his article borrows from trademark law . . . [which] has a channeling 
doctrine and a relatively bright-line rule animated by the overarching policy concern of excluding 
functional items from trademark law in order to preserve the patent bargain . . . .”). 
246 Indeed, though the Court has briefly cited to TrafFix and mentioned functionality a small 
handful of times in the past twenty years, it has never referred to aesthetic functionality or 
referenced the associated non-reputation-related test again. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. 
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 n.5 (2020) (quoting TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32); Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002), superseded by statute, Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 441 (2001). 
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coherently done to begin with) is no longer needed to keep functionality 
doctrine from swallowing all marks, and testing for fragility is a more 
generalized and descriptively accurate version of forbidding “non-reputation-
related” barriers to competition.247 For example, placebo functionality relies 
on the consumer’s psychological associations with the mark, as does social 
functionality. They are both, in that sense, related to producer reputation. 
Thus, assuming TrafFix’s aesthetic test were to be applied to a placebo—or 
socially functional product feature—the feature might be allowed trademark 
protection, matching the real-world landscape of outcomes. But other forms 
of fragile functionality do not easily fit into the narrow description of 
“reputation-related.” At least some aspects of organizational functionality, 
and perhaps all of design and interlocking functionality, have nothing to do 
with reputation per se. Even in a world where nobody has heard of Tiffany & 
Co., for example, Tiffany Blue would still be a perfect match for Tiffany Blue. 
Hence, even if TrafFix’s aesthetic test were to be applied, features exhibiting 
those forms of functionality would potentially be barred from trademark 
protection—a contradiction against real-world results. 
Moreover, unlike the “non-reputation-related” test for aesthetic 
functionality, the fragility formulation is actually a heuristic. That is, it does 
not require a sophisticated, costly examination of anticompetitive effects. 
Recall that only “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage[s]” are 
proscribed by the current test for aesthetic functionality.248 This is not an 
invitation for guesswork or armchair speculation. In the Second Circuit, for 
example, judges are instructed to “carefully weigh ‘the competitive benefits 
of protecting the source-identifying aspects’ of a mark against the 
‘competitive costs of precluding competitors from using the feature’”—a 
“highly fact-specific” analysis.249 Indeed, the detailed analysis required under 
the current test for aesthetic functionality appears to most closely resemble 
something like an antitrust case proceeding under the rule of reason.250 The 
same court, for example, describes the heart of rule-of-reason cases as 
“determining whether a restraint[‘s] . . . anticompetitive effects outweigh its 
 
247 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1996)). 
248 Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). 
249 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
250 See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[T]he court 
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied . . . [and] 
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be 
attained, are all relevant facts.”). 
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procompetitive effects.”251 Taken to completion, this kind of analysis is 
notoriously uncertain, time-consuming, and costly252—the precise opposite 
of a heuristic. In other words, if the current test for aesthetic functionality is 
to be taken seriously, it would require nesting the most challenging form of 
antitrust inquiry within trademark validity decisionmaking. By contrast, recall 
the fragility examples presented thus far: their reliance on trademark 
exclusivity to function is nearly self-evident, or well-established in prior 
scientific literature. And where it is not, it could be demonstrated with no 
more sophisticated tools than those readily familiar to trademark 
adjudicators, lawyers, and firms: consumer surveys and studies.253 
IV. APPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS OF A FRAGILITY STANDARD FOR 
TRADEMARKS 
The examples and analyses presented thus far suggest that trademark law 
is fumbling towards a consensus: protecting beneficial enhancements if and 
only if those enhancements require ongoing protection to manifest. Put 
differently, trademark law seems to exclusively protect fragile forms of 
functionality. The extent of this latent agreement, however, should not be 
overstated. The pattern is strong, but imperfect, as reflected in a number of 
contentious disputes on the outer boundaries of case law and policy. 
This final Part begins by applying the fragility theory of functionality to 
two particularly divisive questions in trademark law—overlapping protection 
under copyright law and protection against dilution or post-sale confusion—
in order to suggest doctrinally coherent answers. In short, copyrighted 
 
251 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 321 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Alt. Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990)); see, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 273 
(3d Cir. 2012) (discussing “balancing . . . the procompetitive justifications” of a practice “against its 
anticompetitive effects”); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The 
rule of reason directs an assessment of the total economic effects of a restrictive practice that is plausibly 
argued to increase competition or other economic values on balance.”); Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE 
Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he restraint is unreasonable as determined by balancing the 
restraint and any justifications or pro-competitive effects of the restraint.”). 
252 Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 7 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 546 (2011) (“Full-blown rule-of-reason analysis subjects defendants 
to considerable expense and uncertainty.”); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and 
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 n.28 (2012) (“The 
proposition that rule of reason litigation can be uncertain and costly . . . does not appear to be 
controversial.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) 
(“Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that 
combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.”). 
253 See, e.g., Gabriel M. Gelb & Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark Litigation: Ready 
or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073, 1075 (2007); Michael Rappeport, Litigation 
Surveys—Social “Science” as Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 957, 957 (2002); Itamar Simonson, The 
Effect of Survey Method on Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 364, 364 (1993). 
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material generally exhibits non-fragile functionalities that should prohibit 
redundant protection under trademark law. By contrast, the fragile 
functionalities of prestige and fame provide a more conceptually sound 
justification for maintaining anti-dilution and post-sale protections for 
marks. The discussion thus shifts from strictly positive to at least weakly 
normative; the description and synthesis from Parts I and II are extended to 
propose further applications that are, at the very least, internally consistent. 
This Part concludes by addressing more robust normative considerations 
head-on, focusing on the consequences of fully embracing a fragility theory 
of trademark functionality. As will be shown, offering trademark protection 
despite the presence of fragile functionalities can be welfare-enhancing in 
many cases. But at the same time, fragile functionalities are apt to generate 
anticompetitive effects in the marketplace and lead to deeply regressive 
distributional consequences. Attempting to prohibit fragile functionalities 
would almost certainly be impractical, welfare-reducing, or both—but these 
consequences are difficult to ignore. Though a complete proposal for 
ameliorative measures is beyond the scope of this Article, an unusual case 
from antitrust law is presented to suggest a potential starting point for future 
research and theory. 
A. Fragility and Copyright 
In most situations, a fragility theory of trademark functionality suggests 
that trademark law should not grant overlapping protection to copyrightable 
material. To be clear, the area of potential overlap is already limited; although 
all “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” 
fall within copyright’s scope,254 most trademarks tend to fall short of that basic 
requirement. “Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans” are 
not copyrightable, including “variations of typographic ornamentation, 
lettering[,] or coloring,”255 due to a perceived lack of creative original 
authorship.256 So from “Apple” and “Think Different” to “Nike” and “Just Do 
It,” overlapping copyright protection is not a genuine concern. Likewise, 
 
254 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
255 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2021). 
256 See, e.g., Ashton v. U.S. Copyright Off., 310 F. Supp. 3d 149, 154-57 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal 
quotation omitted) (“[T]he simple combination and arrangement of the short phrase and word 
simply does not contain any authorship . . . . Plaintiff ’s Work . . . was too short to merit copyright 
protection under the creativity standards for copyrightability.”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
WORKS NOT PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT, CIRCULAR 33, at 2 (2017), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ33.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8H7-D327] (“Words and short 
phrases . . . are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship.”); Justin 
Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 578 (2005) (“A small 
expression is deemed to lack sufficient originality.”). 
2021] A Fragility Theory of Trademark Functionality  1879 
“[m]any logos are deemed not to contain the requisite level of originality”—
such that simple icons like the once-bitten apple and swoosh are out as well.257 
More complex and expressive trademarks, however, can and do rise to the 
level of copyrightable subject matter.258 Iconic characters are perhaps the 
most common case for such overlapping rights in practice, and serve as a 
useful example.259 Consider the creative expression of original authorship 
that is Mr. Peanut: “If an artist creates a fanciful picture of a humanized 
peanut dressed in formal attire complete with top hat, cane, monocle[,] and 
spats, that is a picture eligible for copyright.”260 But Mr. Peanut is also a valid 
trademark,261 “well-known in the trade and to the general public as an 
indication of origin for [Planters’] products.”262 Or consider Mickey Mouse: 
a character protected under copyright law seemingly ad infinitum,263 while 
simultaneously used as a trademark by Disney “to identify and distinguish 
the source of goods or services (e.g.[,] an image of Mickey Mouse on a 
watch).”264 From The Hobbit to The Simpsons, pursuing dual protection has 
largely “become routine among practitioners”—generating significant debate 
and pushback in turn.265 
Under a fragility theory of functionality, this kind of copyright-trademark 
overlap clearly should not be permissible in most cases. The value of the 
original authorial expression that is required by definition for copyright 
 
257 Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping 
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1506 (2004); see, e.g., Yankee Candle 
Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This collection of common geometric 
shapes with a particular photographic technique is not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright 
protection.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2021) (excluding “familiar symbols or designs” from 
copyrightable subject matter). 
258 See generally Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights 
Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239 (2013); Laura A. Heymann, The 
Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007). 
259 See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 257, at 1506-09; Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 
F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“Dual protection under copyright and trademark laws is 
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters.”). 
260 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 6:18. 
261 Id. § 6:18 n.7; see, e.g., MR. PEANUT, Registration No. 4,071,025; MR. PEANUT, 
Registration No. 2,366,818. 
262 Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., 305 F.2d 916, 919 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
263 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065-69 
(2001) (discussing the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, “also known as the 
Mickey Mouse Protection Act”). 
264 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 6:18; see, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., 
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547-48, 577 (D.N.J. 2003) (finding both copyright and trademark 
infringement with respect to various Disney characters appearing in unauthorized “preview” movie 
clips). See generally Franklin Waldheim, Mickey Mouse—Trademark or Copyright?, 54 TRADEMARK 
REP. 865, 866 (1964). 
265 Irene Calboli, Overlapping Trademark and Copyright Protection: A Call for Concern and Action, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 29 (2014). Compare Moffat, supra note 257, with Heymann, supra 
note 258. 
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protection will nearly always influence the cost, quality, use, or purpose of an 
embodying item. And that value is non-fragile; it exists independent of any 
potential trademark exclusivity. A school backpack with the character Batman 
on it, for example, appeals to young students precisely because it has Batman on 
it. Whether it was specifically produced under the supervision of Warner 
Brothers Entertainment Company or not is wholly irrelevant. It strains the 
imagination to conjure up a hypothetical purchaser of a character-emblazoned 
t-shirt, mug, poster, watch, or other such item for whom the character’s 
presence was not valued in and of itself. 
Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized while adjudicating overlapping 
claims of infringement for unauthorized Betty Boop merchandise, the 
character “constitute[s] the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to 
purchase”—an unambiguously “functional product.”266 Plaintiff Fleischer 
Studios could not, in fact, “show a single instance in which a customer was 
misled about the origin, sponsorship, or endorsement” of the merchandise at 
issue.267 The customers knew it came from elsewhere, but they simply didn’t 
care. This logic applies with greater force still to other forms of copyrightable 
subject matter in general; one need only look at the rampant piracy of music, 
games, and movies to see what little importance exclusivity of origin carries. 
On the contrary, peer-to-peer file distribution networks—from Napster to 
BitTorrent—rely precisely on consumers downloading, copying, and 
uploading atomized content chunks as a faceless swarm of nodes.268 
Recall that patentable subject matter can only receive trademark 
protection under very narrow circumstances: when it is used as a completely 
arbitrary embellishment to the product rather than for the utility of its 
innovation.269 Otherwise, the non-fragile functionality that inheres to a 
patentable improvement blocks trademark eligibility. Concurrent fragile 
 
266 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn 
and reh’g denied, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 925 
F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074-75 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“In this regard, the Betty Boop mark as adapted . . . is a 
decorative component: it is part and parcel of the aesthetic design of those goods . . . . Defendants’ 
use of the Betty Boop mark is an aesthetically functional use . . . .”). 
267 Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124. 
268 See Nazareno Andrade, Elizeu Santos-Neto, Francisco Brasileiro & Matei Ripeanu, Resource 
Demand and Supply in BitTorrent Content-Sharing Communities, 53 COMPUT. NETWORKS 515, 516-17 (2009) 
(discussing BitTorrent’s popularity and how users use the platform download files); Jahn Arne Johnsen, Lars 
Erik Karlsen & Sebjørn Sæther Birkeland, Peer-to-Peer Networking with BitTorrent (Dec. 2005) (Student 
Paper, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Telematics) 
http://web.cs.ucla.edu/classes/cs217/05BitTorrent.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBS3-UYYS] (discussing how 
BitTorrent indiscriminately scours the internet for different parts of a specific file from different users). For 
recent support, see Whitson Gordon, How to Use BitTorrent, PC MAG (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-use-bittorrent [https://perma.cc/MAJ6-KLY7]. 
269 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001); see supra notes 
242-45 and accompanying text. 
2021] A Fragility Theory of Trademark Functionality  1881 
functionalities like secondary meaning may exist as well (that is, consumers 
may genuinely associate the innovation with a particular producer), but they 
will not save such a mark from invalidation. So too with copyrightable 
material under a fragility theory of functionality: only in highly unusual cases, 
where a piece of copyrighted content is added to a product arbitrarily rather 
than to capitalize on demand for the value of its expressive content, can 
overlap with trademark be permitted. It is tellingly difficult to imagine such 
a scenario in reality, but something like Betty-Boop-branded windshield 
wiper fluid or tax preparation services might fit the mold. 
Just as with patent law, the Supreme Court has already recognized that 
freely permitting overlapping protection “causes the Lanham Act to conflict 
with the law of copyright”: 
The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a “carefully crafted 
bargain,” under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, 
the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution. 
Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been “careful to caution against 
misuse or over-extension” of trademark and related protections into areas 
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright . . . . [A]llowing a cause of 
action [on these facts] would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits 
the public’s “federal right to ‘copy and to use’” expired copyrights.270 
In other words, to paraphrase the early functionality case law regarding 
patents, trademark law should not gratuitously create monopolies more 
effective than that of copyright—in the ratio of eternity to 70 years.271 
But the Supreme Court’s observation, a highly straightforward symmetry 
of channeling, is not reflected in actual case outcomes—largely because of 
courts’ disagreement and confusion over aesthetic functionality as a category. 
The frequently cited case of In re DC Comics, Inc. is a particularly apt 
example.272 There, the USPTO had rejected trademark protection for 3-D 
representations of Superman, Batman, and the Joker to be used on toy dolls, 
finding that the copyrighted characters were necessarily functional as 
“indispensable elements of the commercial appeal of the product.”273 The 
Federal Circuit’s predecessor court reversed, describing the USPTO’s 
decision as “obscur[ing] the distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic 
functionality”—and reiterating its own position that the latter serves as no 
 
270 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
271 See Pope Automatic Merch. Co., v. McCrum Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1911); see 
supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
272 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
273 Id. at 1045 (quoting In re DC Comics Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 834, 837 (T.T.A.B. 1981)). 
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bar to trademark eligibility.274 In special concurrence, Judge Nies highlighted 
the dangers in permitting such overlap, regardless of doctrinal labels: “[I]f a 
copyrighted doll design is also a trademark for itself, there is question 
whether the quid pro quo for the protection granted under the copyright 
statute has been given, if, upon expiration of the copyright, the design cannot 
be used at all by others.”275 But ultimately, Judge Nies “await[ed] resolution 
in an appropriate case and . . . merely note[d] the problem”—one that has yet 
to come.276 To summarize, whereas a fragility theory makes abundantly clear 
the most internally consistent approach to mediating the copyright-
trademark boundary, the false dichotomies in existing functionality doctrine 
have obfuscated and further contributed to disarray. 
B. Fragility, Dilution, and Post-Sale Confusion 
In the case of copyrighted subject matter, a fragility theory of 
functionality suggests fencing out trademark rights. With respect to dilution 
and post-sale confusion doctrine, however, it instead suggests a unified 
justification (or, perhaps, apology). Since Professor Frank I. Schechter’s 
seminal 1927 article popularized the term,277 the idea of trademark dilution 
has proved enormously controversial.278 So too with post-sale confusion,279 
from its 1955 inception in the Second Circuit up to the present day.280 In 
short, both doctrines are typically characterized as an incongruous expansion 
in trademark rights, fundamentally out of step with the rest of the law. But 
 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 1052 n.6 (Nies, J., specially concurring). 
276 Id. at 1053 n.6. 
277 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
832 (1927) (describing the Odol court’s holding that the “[c]omplainant’s ability to compete with 
other manufacturers . . . will be impaired if the significance of its mark is lessened”). 
278 See generally Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting 
the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 377 (2011) 
(examining in detail “why the dilution doctrine has sparked so much criticism in academia”); 
Kenneth L. Port, The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final Thoughts on Trademark Dilution, 46 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 681 (2017) (“[I]t is clear that the vast majority of the hundreds of articles 
produced regarding the controversial topic of trademark dilution have viewed it negatively.”); Beebe, 
supra note 138, at 849-51 (describing “the antidilution cause of action itself ” as “a failure”). 
279 See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 67, 78-79 (2012) (“Scholars criticize [post-sale confusion] . . . on the ground that [it 
is] . . . disconnected from the search costs theory and inconsistent with consumer interests.”); James 
Grace, Note, The End of Post-Sale Confusion: How Consumer 3D Printing Will Diminish the Function of 
Trademarks, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 274 (2014) (collecting critiques, and observing that 
“opponents of post-sale confusion believe that it is an otiose doctrine that fails to advance the dual 
goals of trademark law in light of other available remedies”). 
280 See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 
221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (noting that the “likelihood of . . . confusion” in distinguishing 
clocks made by plaintiff and defendant “render[s] plaintiff ’s conduct actionable”). 
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there is a genuine theoretical consistency—that of protecting fragile 
functionalities—that directly undercuts this critique. 
As codified by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act281 and Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act,282 anti-dilution rights protect “the owner of a famous 
mark” from unauthorized use “that is likely to cause . . . blurring 
or . . . tarnishment . . . , regardless of the presence or absence of actual or 
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”283 Dilution by 
“blurring” refers to uses “that impair[] the distinctiveness of the famous mark,” 
whereas dilution by “tarnishment” refers to uses that “harm[] the reputation 
of the famous mark.”284 Dilution by blurring is, in other words, about 
weakening the association between a famous mark and its goods or services, 
regardless of whether the infringer actually competes with the mark owner or 
genuinely tricks customers. No one is apt to be truly fooled by “Buick”-
branded aspirin285 or “Blockbuster”-branded fireworks,286 but the marks’ 
“capacity to identify and distinguish” is plainly reduced.287 Permitting 
“Chanel”-branded real estate services, for example, will eventually cause 
consumers to associate the mark with high-fashion items and home-buying, 
rather than strictly the former.288 
Dilution by tarnishment, in contrast, is about weakening the perceived 
caliber of goods and services bearing the famous mark—again, regardless of 
actual effects on competition or purchaser confusion. A pornographic website 
named “Barbie’s Playpen,” for example, “may well tarnish the image of 
Mattel’s BARBIE products in the minds of . . . consumers,” despite the low 
likelihood that an observer would think the children’s toy manufacturer was 
genuinely responsible for the site.289 So too with commercial posters telling 
 
281 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
282 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
283 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
284 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)-(C) (emphases added). 
285 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 
(providing background for new trademark legislation suggesting that dilution, unlike trademark 
infringement, does not rely upon the likelihood of confusion). 
286 See Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
although the district court denied trademark infringement claims, the Blockbuster trademark is 
protected against “subsequent uses that tarnish or disparage or blur the distinctiveness of the mark”). 
287 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 
955 F. Supp. 605, 605-06, 616 (E.D. Va. 1997) (adjudicating dilution by blurring of the joint circus’ 
“GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH” mark by the state travel agency’s “GREATEST SNOW ON 
EARTH” mark), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
288 See Chanel, Inc. v. Makarczyk, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
289 Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc., 2000 WL 973745, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000); 
see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737, 750 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (finding 
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the viewer to “Enjoy Cocaine” in the same color and typeface as Coca-Cola’s 
logo, thereby associating “such a noxious substance as cocaine” with the 
“wholesome beverage” of Coca-Cola290 (which, though manufactured using 
coca leaves, has not contained any traces of the illicit narcotic for over a 
century291). Put differently, linking the mark “to products of shoddy quality,” 
or portraying it “in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke 
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product,” will eventually cause 
consumers to associate the mark with a “lack of quality or lack of prestige.”292 
Post-sale confusion, finally, refers to claims of trademark infringement 
“based on confusion of consumers other than direct purchasers,” such as 
“observers of those wearing an accused article.”293 For example, “no one would 
ever expect to purchase, nor intend to purchase a genuine Rolex watch for $25 
at a flea market.”294 Any would-be customer is clearly in on the ruse, and 
happily buying an imitation. But once these “Rolexes” have been purchased 
and are worn in public, subsequent observers—“believing them to be genuine 
Rolex watches”—“might find themselves unimpressed with the 
quality . . . and consequently be inhibited from purchasing the real time 
piece.”295 Likewise, those “who see . . . the Rolex trademarks on so many 
wrists might find themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine because 
the items have become too common place and no longer possess the prestige 
once associated with them.”296 The precise doctrinal contours vary, but only 
one federal circuit court (the D.C. Circuit) has yet to explicitly recognize this 
notion of post-sale confusion in some form.297 And though high fashion items 
 
“Victor’s Secret,” a store for “adult videos as well as sex toys,” to tarnish the reputation of “Victoria’s 
Secret” as a “well-respected retailer of high-quality women’s lingerie”). 
290 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
291 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1920) (noting that coca leaves are only 
used in the production of Coca-Cola after a “drastic process that removes from them every 
characteristic substance except a little tannin and still less chlorophyl”). 
292 Deere & Co., v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). 
293 Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
294 Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
295 Id. at 495. Professor Jeremy Sheff offers a highly useful systematized account of post-sale 
confusion doctrine in the courts, referring to this particular subtype of harm as “bystander 
confusion.” Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 773-74 (2012). 
296 Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 645 F. Supp. at 495. In Professor Sheff ’s account, this is referred 
to as “status confusion.” Sheff, supra note 295, at 774. 
297 See, e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc., 998 F.2d at 989; IP Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co., 163 
F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-
73 (2d Cir. 1986); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Lab’ys.,Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987); Polo 
Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 
130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1989); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); 
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996); Insty*Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 
95 F.3d 663, 669-72 (8th Cir. 1996); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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are prototypical cases,298 successful claims have involved products ranging 
from writing pens299 to auto body kits300 to hockey merchandise.301 
What anti-dilution and post-sale confusion protections have in common 
is their shift in focus away from the most well-recognized and celebrated 
functions of trademarks: reducing search costs and providing a reputational 
incentive for quality. In the absence of purchaser confusion, neither function 
is likely to be substantially impaired—mistakes are not being made in 
accurately finding genuine products to buy, experience, and recall when 
buying again. But dilution dispenses with confusion as a prerequisite entirely, 
and post-sale confusion by definition does not concern itself with the 
purchaser’s point of view. Understandably, then, critics are relatively quick to 
characterize these forms of protection as an aberration from the rest of 
trademark law. Dilution doctrine, skeptics say, “threatens to sever trademark 
law from its policy moorings,” and perhaps “lacks a coherent policy 
foundation” altogether.302 Along similar lines, post-sale confusion is labeled 
 
298 See, e.g., Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 106, 108 (2d Cir. 
2000) (discussing whether an injunction should be issued to prevent Lederer from selling replicas 
of Hermès handbags, which have an average retail value of $5,000); see also Polo Fashions, 816 F.2d at 
147 (affirming the judgment of damages for Polo Fashions, “a well-known fashion house” with a 
“reputation for quality”). 
299 See, e.g., A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 690 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(analyzing whether there was trademark infringement of plaintiff ’s mechanical pens and pencils); 
T&T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 535-36 (1st Cir. 1978) (same). 
300 See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1238 (examining whether “fiberglass kits that 
replicate the exterior features” of Ferrari cars constitutes post-sale confusion); Rolls-Royce Motors, 
Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (same). 
301 See, e.g., Bos. Prof ’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 
(5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (recognizing that “a sports fan in his local sporting goods store[] 
would not be likely to think that defendant’s emblems were manufactured by or had some connection 
with plaintiffs,” but nevertheless that “the public would identify them as being the teams’ 
trademarks”). 
302 Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BULL. 187, 187-188 (2007); see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) (“The most obvious example of doctrinal creep in 
trademark law is dilution . . . .”); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is 
a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 526 (1995) (arguing that the dilution 
cause of action “grossly expands trademark rights, and . . . is only justified by a now out-dated and 
discredited version of natural rights”); David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 531, 532 (1991) (“The protection offered by [anti-dilution] statutes differs from 
traditional trademark protection because they do not require a showing that consumers are likely to 
be confused . . . . This form of protection has the potential for granting a virtual exclusive property 
right in a trademark to its owner, something that traditional trademark law has eschewed.”); John 
Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 602 (1937) (“The very 
incongruousness of Schechter’s theory with the tradition and the fundamental principles of the 
common law [of unfair competition and trademarks] forms the chief obstacle to its general 
acceptance . . . .”). 
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an “unnecessary” doctrine that “is not aligned with the core principles of 
trademark law.”303 
But what anti-dilution and post-sale confusion also have in common is 
their capacity to protect the fragile functionalities of well-established 
trademarks. Recall, for example, how placebo functionality is mediated by 
consumer associations: the boost to quality appears to rely both on the brand’s 
distinctiveness as well as its overall reputation. A Nike-branded golf club 
confers a putting advantage above and beyond a Gucci-branded golf club; a 
Red-Bull-branded drink confers a cognitive advantage above and beyond a 
Sprite-branded drink.304 Where there is dilution by blurring, unrelated new 
goods and services have been added to consumers’ associations—so “Nike” 
ceases to immediately convey “sporting excellence” because there are Nike-
branded diapers on the market and “Red Bull” ceases to immediately convey 
“energy and focus” because there are Red-Bull-branded sleeping masks.305 
The effects of dilution by tarnishment are perhaps even more 
straightforward. When something as simple as the color pink can enhance the 
soothing effects of medicine, it’s difficult to imagine that linking the brand to 
unsavory or offensive subject matter won’t have the opposite effect.306 
Likewise, even when consumers are not actually confused as to authenticity, 
negative reactions to counterfeit items appear to be “contagious, reaching 
authentic goods and negating any performance-enhancing effect” by creating 
false subconscious associations of inferiority.307 
Social functionality may be affected by dilution in similar ways, but it 
clearly depends on the viability of post-sale confusion doctrine in particular. 
Whether purchased knowingly or not, the circulation of cheap and shoddy 
“Louis Vuitton” handbags directly undermines the mark’s ability to “stake a 
 
303 Connie Davis Powell, We All Know It’s a Knock-Off ! Re-Evaluating the Need for the Post-Sale 
Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (2012); see, e.g., Sheff, supra note 
295, at 775-76 (2012) (describing post-sale confusion doctrine as “an odd role for trademark law to 
play,” at odds with “the conventional theoretical account of trademarks,” and arguing that it “be 
discarded entirely”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
413, 445 n.125 (2010) (criticizing the post-sale confusion doctrine because it is unclear whether 
confusion “actually affects purchasing decisions”); cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 
Rethinking Post-Sale Confusion, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 881, 884 (2018) (arguing that current post-sale 
confusion doctrine fails to map onto “the core purposes of trademark law, which are to allow 
consumers to economize on search costs, and to facilitate producers’ incentives to invest in product 
quality”). 
304 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
305 See generally Linford, supra note 172, at 95 (acknowledging that dilution by blurring “might 
unravel the psychological performance bump” of certain brand-mediated placebo effects). 
306 See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
307 Linford, supra note 172, at 96; see generally supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
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claim to social status . . . . due to indiscriminate use.”308 The same can be said 
for marks that convey charitability instead. Over time, the existence of knock-
off (PRODUCT) headphones or TOMS shoes means that wearing a pair no 
longer guarantees that any contribution has been made towards positive ends. 
It is the perspective of observers—not purchasers—that determines social 
functionality; post-sale confusion allows trademark infringement to address 
that perspective. 
Without belaboring the point, analogous claims can be made with respect 
to organizational, design, and interlocking functionality as well. Even if the 
original purchaser is not confused by a fake “USB-ready” device, for example, 
there may be others exposed to its poor performance—observers, borrowers, 
secondhand buyers, repairmen—who quickly conclude that the certification 
is meaningless. Or consider dinner guests and restaurant patrons served 
utterly undrinkable fake “Napa Valley” wines; whatever power exists in the 
mark to promote industry buy-in will steadily evaporate. Interlocking 
functionality is likewise vulnerable even in the absence of purchaser 
confusion. Even obviously fake “Lego” bricks or “Keurig” pods that 
successfully interlock reduce the true brand owner’s control over downstream 
markets. And if it fails to interlock with the real product (or perhaps even 
damages it), consumers may erroneously blame the real product rather than 
the imitator (or, through warranty, shift the costs of replacement and repair 
to the true brand owner). Design functionality, meanwhile, is a direct product 
of distinctiveness—and even wholly unrelated goods that copy the same 
design reduce that distinctiveness. If the characteristic shape of, say, a Zippo 
lighter no longer immediately conveys the Zippo brand, then it becomes 
necessary to rely on more costly and limiting ways of ensuring brand 
prominence.309 
To reiterate, this is far from a full-throated defense of anti-dilution and 
post-sale confusion protections. But to the extent that they are responsible—
indeed, wholly necessary—for protecting fragile functionalities, they cannot 
truly be considered an aberration relative to the rest of trademark law. As 
demonstrated throughout this Article, search-cost reductions and quality-
reputation incentives are at their core analogous to more exotic phenomena 
like placebo effects and conspicuous consumption. Enabling those 
phenomena to manifest through exclusivity of marks is not an incoherent 
result. On the contrary, these forms of additional protection suggest that the 
 
308 Sheff, supra note 159, at 774; see also Beebe, supra note 138, at 851-55 (“[T]he doctrine of 
post-sale confusion . . . . holds that even if consumers are not confused at the point of sale as to the 
true source of the goods that they are purchasing, other consumers may be confused as to the source 
of those goods after the sale.”). 
309 See supra notes 215-223 and accompanying text. 
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negative space of trademark law actually exhibits a meaningful connection to 
its positive scope: non-fragile functionalities defeat trademark eligibility, but 
fragile functionalities are the reason for trademark protection in all its variable 
forms. 
C. Fragility and Welfare Effects 
A few brief examples follow, to demonstrate the very real benefits—and 
potential harms—of a trademark system that tolerates and protects fragile 
functionalities broadly. First, consider a hypothetical pharmaceutical market 
with only two goods: the unbranded, generic version of drug “X” and the 
identical, formerly patented version that is trademarked “XTRA,” sold by 
PharmCo. Any company is free to make and sell drug X, so competition 
among generics is robust. But XTRA, as a result of placebo effect 
functionality, is superior to the generic version to at least some degree—
patients report fewer side effects and greater pain relief. Accordingly, though 
the precise differential varies from person to person, any given consumer 
receives an equal or greater amount of utility from XTRA than from drug X. 
Thus, take a simple numerical example for the demand side of the market, 
assuming each consumer wants (at most) one pill of drug X per time period: 
 
Table 1: Consumer Utility from Generic Versus XTRA 
 
Consumer Generic Utility XTRA Utility 
A 3 5 
B 5 7 
C 5 5 
D 7 12 
E 9 14 
 
Assume also, for the time being, that all manufacturers face an identical 
marginal cost of $1 per pill, with trivial fixed costs. The generic manufacturers 
exist in a state of perfect competition, so their price will tend to settle on or 
around that same $1 point. In contrast, PharmCo enjoys some leeway in the 
exact price that it is able to charge for XTRA, since it is acting as a quasi-
monopolist. That being said, pricing XTRA too high means that consumers 
will substitute for the readily available drug X. 
Assuming PharmCo is pricing rationally—that is to say, maximizing 
profits—it would price at $4. Doing so, it garners sales from consumers D and 
E, for a total of $8 in revenue, and $6 in profit. Consumers A, B, and C choose 
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the generic, since their utility differential is less than the difference in cost. 
The following surpluses result: 
 
Table 2: PharmCo and Generic Surplus 
 










Compare this outcome to a scenario where XTRA does not exist—only 
generics. Again, perfect competition suggests that the price per pill will 
stabilize at $1. The consumers’ utility from taking generic drug X is 
unchanged. The following surpluses result: 
 
Table 3: Generic-Only Surplus 
 









Not only is total surplus lower, but two consumers are clearly worse off—
D and E—and no consumer is in a better position. Real value has been lost, 
merely by taking away the quality enhancement associated with XTRA’s 
placebo effect. 
Now, it may actually be the case that PharmCo faces higher costs than the 
generic manufacturers. Maintaining the XTRA trademark—including 
advertising and, if need be, legal enforcement—creates expenditures that the 
other companies need not worry about, and in all other respects the products 
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are identical. Some of these costs (like advertising) might be largely fixed 
regardless of units sold, whereas others may be true marginal costs (like 
stamping a logo onto each pill). But even so, as long as the placebo effect 
creates a sufficiently large boost to utility, there is enough room for a greater 
price differential to support the XTRA market. Indeed, in the numerical 
example above, even if PharmCo’s marginal cost per pill were double that of 
the generic ($2), little would change: it would still price at $4, receive D and 
E as customers, and generate $8 in revenue. PharmCo’s profits would decrease 
to $4, and total surplus would accordingly drop to 26—both still higher than 
in the world without XTRA.310 
Returning to certification marks provides another example. Imagine a new 
type of hi-fidelity audio jack, SONAport, created by a standards–setting 
organization using several different patented technologies. SONAport 
becomes fairly popular, and product manufacturers begin to implement the 
technology on everything from desktop computers to cheap, disposable plug-
in devices. Unfortunately, this leads to considerable variation in quality—
some products visually appear to (or on their packaging claim to) have 
SONAport compatibility, but attempting actual audio play yields only poor-
quality noise, static, or silence. Even good-faith implementing manufacturers 
have mixed performance results because the technology is still novel and 
challenging to implement. Over time, consumers looking for SONAport 
products are averse to purchasing from any manufacturer without either a 
well-established name in the electronic audio market or a very generous trial 
period and return policy. As a result, only a small number of companies are 
able to successfully sell devices implementing the standard, and at a relatively 
higher cost—a poor result for producers and consumers alike. 
Imagine instead that the patent owners band together to create a 
certification mark, SONAready, certifying devices’ successful operability 
with SONAport. They are able to do so fairly cheaply and easily; voluntarily 
submitted product test samples and boilerplate licensing agreements do most 
of the work, and they are already on the lookout for infringers due to their 
stake in the underlying patents. The patent owners, moreover, have a natural 
financial incentive to police such a mark: by ensuring customers’ interactions 
with SONAport are smooth and seamless, they are helping to grow the 
reputation and demand for their technology, with more royalties to follow. 
By credibly signaling SONAport compatibility, the mark enables a greater 
number of manufacturers to successfully market SONAport products at a 
lower cost. As a result, the overall price for those products is lower. There 
may be spillover effects as well. Insofar as the mark allows smaller, less well-
 
310 Note, moreover, that this example relies on none of the other benefits typically associated 
with trademarks, such as reductions in search costs or reputation-based incentives toward quality. 
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established manufacturers to compete more easily with larger ones, the mark 
may have procompetitive and equalizing effects in the wider audio electronics 
market. In short, permitting fragile forms of trademark functionality can 
potentially be welfare-enhancing. 
But at the same time, there may be significant distributional costs. For 
example, recall the earplugs experiment showing placebo functionality; subjects 
given 3M-branded earplugs achieved higher scores on a noise-disrupted math 
test than subjects given identical (but unlabeled) earplugs.311 Another experiment 
by the same authors found that, among subjects who reported that stress tended 
to inhibit their productivity, a Kaplan GMAT preparation app was more helpful 
than an identical, but fictionally branded, “Laserprep” app.312 Like the numerical 
examples presented above, permitting this form of functionality may translate 
into higher test score averages overall—but it also widens the achievement gap 
between rich and poor. In a world where test scores and grades feed into zero-
sum competitions for greater opportunities, students who can’t afford name-
brand school supplies may be subject to a real, metacognitive, and possibly even 
self-reinforcing disadvantage. 
Likewise, consider the various medical examples of placebo functionality. 
Costlier, name-brand pharmaceuticals outperform their cheaper, generic 
counterparts.313 Those who can afford the former will experience less pain and 
greater therapeutic effect; those who can’t will suffer the difference. 
Inequitable access to medical resources is, no doubt, a much larger and more 
severe problem than the trademark differential alone; potentially life-saving 
treatments may be denied entirely on the basis of ability to pay. But contrast 
the trademark differential with another cause of inequitable access due to 
intellectual property: patents. Granting inventors a temporary monopoly 
position over their invention means higher prices and greater scarcity for 
buyers in the short term. But in the long run, per incentive theory,314 as those 
 
311 See Garvey et al., supra note 3, at 939 (“[P]erformance brand heightens state self-esteem 
and, as a result, (1) reduces anxiety and thereby improves performance, and (2) increases consumer 
attributions for performance to the self . . . .”). 
312 Id. at 939-42 (“When individuals held the belief that stress is debilitating, a stronger 
performance brand resulted in a positive performance placebo . . . in which decreased anxiety 
resulted in enhanced performance.”). 
313 See supra notes 170-73, 179-80 and accompanying text. 
314 See NARD, supra note 36, at 2 (2008) (stating that, via financial rewards, patent laws 
incentivize invention, information disclosure, licensing, and the investment of capital in the 
innovation process); Sipe, supra note 244, at 1046 (“A system of patent law thus offers a mechanism 
by which to incentivize innovation and capitalize on the overall benefits to the economy as a whole.”); 
STUDY OF SUBCOMM. ON PATS., TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, 33 (Comm. Print 
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (“The thesis that the patent system may produce effective profit 
incentives for inventive activity and thereby promote progress in the technical arts is widely 
accepted.”). 
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monopoly profits drive greater innovation and formerly patented inventions 
pass into the public domain, everyone’s access is gradually improved. In other 
words, the prohibitively expensive, patented therapy of today will eventually 
become commonplace and cheaply available to all. Patents, at least in theory, 
could thus satisfy something like John Rawls’s maximin principle for 
distributive justice.315 That same moral justification, however, cannot be given 
to the trademark differential—there is no mechanism in the law itself for 
eventually spreading or sharing access with those less well off. Instead, it is 
exclusively those with greater resources who benefit, in perpetuity. 
Consider, too, the overall effects of tolerating fragile types of functionality 
on marketplace competition. Placebo and social functionalities suggest that 
new market entrants face an artificial barrier to entry due to trademarks alone. 
Even if the products are otherwise identical, consumers may perceive the 
unbranded or newcomer-branded versions as automatically inferior and be 
unwilling to pay a comparable price. Interlocking functionality can act as an 
even more complete exclusion, depending on how strict consumers’ 
preferences are with respect to matching colors, fitting toy parts together, and 
so on. In this sense, interlocking functionality risks many of the same 
competitive harms as tying arrangements—selling one product “on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product.”316 
Organizational functionality goes yet another step further, better enabling a 
group of firms to advance their collective interests. Their group efforts—from 
advertising to lobbying—could naturally be to the detriment of those in a 
competing industry or region (consider wines just outside of Napa Valley, or 
breweries inside). To wit, even within a certification mark’s nominal scope, 
certification marks can be wielded or redefined “to exclude certain businesses 
inconsistently or arbitrarily,” with the effect of suppressing competition.317 By 
enforcing exclusive control over fragile functionalities, the long-term result 
 
315 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971) (holding that, for “[s]ocial and 
economic inequalities” to be justified, they must ultimately be for “the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged”); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 109-20 (2011) 
(mapping Rawlsian principles onto patent and copyright law). 
316 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Such arrangements have long been 
recognized as having a “creeping” tendency to “create a monopoly.” Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 
332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) 
(“It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that 
certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are 
unreasonable . . . .”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 467 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)). 
317 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L. REV. 121, 123 (2017). 
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in some sectors may be quasi-monopolistic: reduced output, higher prices, 
and harm to consumers and would-be producers alike.318 
That being said, even if one finds the distributional and anticompetitive 
consequences of fragile functionalities concerning, it is a separate question 
whether trademark law itself ought to address them. As outlined in the next 
section, the answer to that question is almost certainly no. The practical and 
conceptual challenges that would come from proscribing fragile functionality 
(while simultaneously maintaining the traditional reasons for having a 
trademark regime at all) are considerable. A better answer, as it turns out, 
may lie in the complementary legal regime of antitrust law instead. 
D. Breaking Fragility 
To start, imagine a hypothetical trademark regime that forbids fragile and 
non-fragile functionality alike, as a rule. That is, imagine if courts took the 
terms of TrafFix at true face value: “[A] product feature is functional, and 
cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”319 As noted earlier, this 
regime would seem to forbid any trademark that successfully performs its 
traditional, celebrated functions of reducing search costs or incentivizing 
quality through reputation.320 Even if a trademark lacked secondary meaning 
at the time of application, as soon as it gained such recognition among the 
consuming public, it would have to be invalidated as functional. In such a 
world, it’s difficult to imagine any firm incurring the costs of branding at all—
with an accompanying parade of horribles in the marketplace as a result. 
So then assume that the courts or Congress simply make an exception for 
the traditional functions of marks, but otherwise continue to enforce a 
prohibition against fragile and non-fragile functionalities alike. Observe that 
all certification marks would still eventually be invalidated for their distinct 
cost-saving and quality-improvement effects, categorized earlier as a kind of 
organizational functionality.321 As with the traditional functions of marks 
overall, these are well-recognized and celebrated effects.322 The courts might, 
 
318 This issue is likely exacerbated by trademark doctrines that accord additional privileges to 
particularly longstanding and wealthy firms—like dilution’s limited application to “famous” marks. 
See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
319 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting Qualitex v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
320 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text. 
322 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 317, at 127-28 (“Certification marks serve a similar role [as trademarks] 
in providing shorthand information to consumers that certified goods or services comply with standards 
about which they might care, such as complex religious rules for being kosher.”). 
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therefore, make another carveout exception from the overall rule to allow for 
certification marks to carry out their clearly intended function. 
Even if these particular species of fragile functionality can be set aside, 
however, the remaining ones still appear largely unavoidable for trademark 
owners. Consider placebo functionality. The positive effects on health, taste, 
performance, and other metrics manifest as a result of consumer belief 
(conscious or otherwise) in the superior quality of the product. But again, 
this is precisely the same belief that is contemplated by having a trademark 
system at all. It does not seem possible for a producer to, on the one hand, 
communicate to consumers that its product is excellent (thereby fulfilling the 
traditional reputation-quality function of marks) and, on the other hand, 
prevent the psychosomatic consequences of that message being internalized 
by the consumer. In a similar vein, consider social functionality. The cultural 
cachet associated with high-status brands is, in many ways, a natural by-
product of building a longstanding reputation for quality. So too with 
conspicuously charitable marks—the company’s deliberately cultivated 
reputation, in terms of business practices and giving, is the reason its mark 
carries social meaning. Even more challenging, marks can develop a cultural 
significance wholly independent of a producer’s intentions. Sidney Swartz, 
who created the iconic Original Yellow Timberland Boot in 1973—a 
waterproof design targeted specifically at New Englanders—could hardly 
have predicted its rise in recent decades as a coast-to-coast, hip-hop style 
icon.323 Even if a producer somehow manages to thread the needle of 
establishing a valuable reputation without simultaneously courting social 
functionality, the consumers might just create it themselves. In a world with 
these seemingly unavoidable invalidation risks, the incentives to engage in 
branding at all largely disappear. 
Design and interlocking functionality are less universal, and so in some 
ways less problematic for this hypothetical trademark regime as a whole. But 
they too are largely unavoidable, at least within certain classes of marks. A 
trademark based on a product’s overall shape allows for certain cost savings. 
A color mark creates certain match-quality advantages. Per the examples 
given earlier, many logos likely do as well.324 A trademark regime that even 
carefully forbids fragile functionality, in other words, may still foreclose 
entire categories of nontraditional marks. What would remain is, at best, a 
substantially less rich and diverse landscape for trademarks. For the reasons 
given above, it more likely would mean no trademarks at all. 
 
323 Secrets of an Icon: The Original Yellow Boot™, TIMBERLAND 
https://www.timberland.com/blog/archive/original-yellow-boot.html [https://perma.cc/NRC2-
GGBM]. 
324 See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text. 
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E. Improving Fragility 
Invalidating trademarks that exhibit fragile functionalities may not be 
possible without unraveling the entire system, but an unusual case in the field 
of antitrust law suggests an avenue for future research into ameliorative 
solutions where needed. 
As outlined earlier in this Part, granting one producer (or a group of 
producers) exclusive control over a fragile functionality can have 
anticompetitive effects. Those effects might, in some circumstances, be large 
enough to swamp the welfare gains from preserving the fragile functionality 
in the first place. At the same time, nesting a full market competition analysis 
within trademark validity decision making—truly adjudicating the balance on 
a case-by-case basis for every application or dispute—cannot be the correct 
approach. As a matter of positive law, the Supreme Court’s preference for 
practical heuristics in trademark functionality is clearly established.325 And as 
a matter of normative goals, the complexity and cost of these (necessarily 
frequent) analyses would pose their own major threat to efficiency. Moreover, 
at least with respect to processing trademark applications and appeals, there 
is simply a lack of relevant expertise and human resources; as of this writing, 
the PTO has only seven economists on staff.326 There were over four hundred 
thousand new trademark registrations in FY2020.327 
Rather than task trademark doctrine and adjudicators with fine-tuning 
competition directly, antitrust law may be able to shoulder the burden. In 
particular, the doctrine governing essential facilities is a surprisingly intuitive 
fit to address the more egregiously anticompetitive cases of fragile 
functionality. In brief, the essential facilities doctrine prevents “one firm with 
monopoly control over an asset that serves as a vital input for its competitors 
[from] refus[ing] to grant a competitor access.”328 For example, in the first 
Supreme Court case on the issue, one group of railroads held exclusive control 
over the only bridges and switching yards accessing St. Louis; the Court held 
 
325 See supra Part I. 
326 See Economic Researchers, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-international-affairs/office-chief-economist-16 
[https://perma.cc/BY5G-68YT] (showing the seven current economists on staff at the USPTO). 
327 See Trademarks Data Q4 2020 at a Glance, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/trademarks/ [https://perma.cc/9SUS-HHNN] (tabulating “new 
registrations by fiscal year”). 
328 Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under 
U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 447 (2002); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he essential facilities doctrine imposes liability 
when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a 
product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first.”); Byars v. 
Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979) (“[A] business or group of businesses which 
controls a scarce facility has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access to it.”). 
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that the group was obligated to grant reasonable access to competing 
railroads, since a failure to do so would “close the door to competition” in the 
region entirely.329 Many of the successful essential facilities cases involve 
these kinds of bottleneck, physical assets: a telecommunications company 
required to provide access to its local service network for long-distance 
competition;330 a stadium owner prevented from excluding competing 
franchises or sports leagues;331 or an electric utility obligated to sell power 
wholesale to municipalities competing in the retail market.332 But the 
exclusive control conferred by intellectual property law has also given rise to 
a number of cases. Copyrighted news content,333 telephone directory 
listings,334 software,335 and even movie promotional materials336 have all, for 
example, been subject to essential facilities scrutiny. 
To be clear, there is no essential facilities case law directly on point for 
trademarks in particular. But the idea is far from foreign to antitrust history. 
 
329 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 398 (1912). 
330 See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to make the 
facility available on non-discriminatory terms.”). 
331 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The essential facility 
doctrine, also called the ‘bottleneck principle,’ states that ‘where facilities cannot practicably be 
duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on 
fair terms.”); Fishman v. Est. of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming a trial court 
finding that Chicago Stadium was an essential facility and that refusing to allow competitors to lease 
it violated the essential facility doctrine). 
332 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973) (“The record makes 
abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose 
competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the 
antitrust law.”). 
333 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1945) (“[A]greement between 
AP and the Canadian Press, under which AP secured exclusive right to receive the news rep orts of 
the Canadian Press and its members, was also, when taken in connection with the restrictive 
membership agreements, in violation of the Sherman Act.”). 
334 See, e.g., BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 
1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing 
accusations of antitrust violations in the context of a corporation refusing to provide a competitor 
with business classifications and updates essential to competing in the telephone directory business); 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 617-20 (D. Kan. 1990), rev’d on other 
grounds, 506 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that white page listings could be essential facilities, 
though evidence in the present case “fell far short of that adduced in other essential facility cases”). 
335 See, e.g., Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 334, 343-44 (D. Md. 1990) 
(discussing Data General’s alleged attempt to monopolize the service market by placing restrictions 
on its MV/ADEX software use); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 
185, 191 (D. Mass. 1991) (“Grumman argues that MV/ADEX is an essential facility which [Data 
General] . . . must share with its competitors.”). 
336 See, e.g., Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(discussing the alleged monopolistic behavior of a company that produced standard accessories for 
motion pictures). 
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Consider the Federal Trade Commission’s complaint in In the Matter of 
Borden, Inc., against the maker of ReaLemon juice: 
[Borden] has adopted and placed into effect and carried out various policies, 
acts and practices to lessen, restrain, eliminate and prevent the distribution 
or sale of reconstituted lemon juice . . . in the United States. Among such 
monopolistic policies, acts and practices, [Borden] engaged in the following: 
. . . 
(e) Erecting barriers to entry into the reconstituted lemon juice market 
through extensive trademark promotion and advertising which has artificially 
differentiated Borden’s reconstituted lemon juice from comparable products of 
its competitors . . . .337 
In determining the appropriate relief, the administrative law judge’s 
initial decision stated that “[f]or competition to enter the processed lemon 
juice industry, the barrier to entry which inheres in the ReaLemon trademark 
must be eliminated.”338 Reasoning by analogy to various patent and copyright 
cases, the administrative law judge held that “the only effective relief . . . 
requires the licensing of the ReaLemon brand name to others wishing to 
enter the production, marketing and sale of processed reconstituted lemon 
juice.”339 The FTC’s final order did not go so far as to impose this mandatory 
licensing, finding it unnecessary on top of the other remedies imposed, but 
explicitly stated such a remedy would be appropriate in more extreme or 
persistent cases.340 And the Sixth Circuit, when affirming the final order, 
appeared inclined to agree.341 
Antitrust law is better suited, in many ways, to determine whether a 
trademark’s power poses an unacceptable threat to competition. As noted 
earlier, the careful balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects is familiar 
territory to antitrust doctrine, with its rule-of-reason framework developed 
and honed through more than a century of case law.342 The Department of 
Justice and FTC, moreover, have precisely the relevant expertise needed to 
 
337 Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 671 (1978) (complaint) (emphasis added); see also id. at 763 
(initial decision) (“[T]he price differences between ReaLemon lemon juice and competing brands 
reflected artificial differentiation due to brand acceptance, length of time in the market, etc . . . . 
[rather than] genuine and actual product differences.”). 
338 Id. at 774. 
339 Id. at 775. 
340 Id. at 807 (final order) (“While an order requiring licensing or suspension of a trademark 
may be ordered as a means of dissipating . . . monopoly power, we are mindful that the remedy is a 
severe one, and should be imposed only where less drastic means appear unlikely to suffice.”). 
341 Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 512 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 940 
(1983) (affirming the final order and recognizing that, at least in the abstract, trademarks with such 
power could “unreasonably restrict competition” as prohibited by the antitrust laws). 
342 See supra notes 236-251 and accompanying text. 
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perform sophisticated market analyses—analyses that would be outside the 
current capacity of the USPTO.343 Indeed, well beyond essential facilities 
doctrine in particular, antitrust enforcers seem more than willing to engage 
with and regulate the proper boundaries of intellectual property rights vis–
à–vis open and fair competition.344 
The ReaLemon case was, to say the least, highly controversial.345 In 
particular, after political turnover among the commissioners and chairman, 
the FTC ultimately reached settlement with Borden through a weaker, 
modified order that largely repudiated the earlier holding.346 Even at a basic 
level, it would require considerable intellectual effort to adequately address 
how antitrust law might be sensibly, predictably, and systematically applied 
to trademark ownership at all. But as the evidence of trademarks’ 
psychological, social, and economic power has only grown, it may be worth 
the inquiry. If one is deeply concerned about the anticompetitive effects of 
the phenomena described throughout this Article, antitrust law has the 
potential to provide a more comprehensive and sound approach than 
trademark law itself can hope to offer. 
 
343 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
47 (2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VGE3-JZHW] (determining that the expanded merger review process used since 
the 1970s “has led to the development of substantial expertise within” the DOJ and FTC); Diane S. 
Owen, Economists in the Antitrust Division, CSWEP NEWS, no. 1, 2016, at 7, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/economists-in-the-antitrust-division/download 
[https://perma.cc/6QAN-FRRC] (“Every merger and conduct investigation has at least one 
economist on it from the outset, and complex or data-rich matters can have six or eight with different 
areas of responsibility divided up by interest and skills.”). 
344 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download 
[https://perma.cc/X2C4-A79J]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/27P4-9SXL]. 
345 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Antitrust, and the Federal Trade Commission, 13 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 151, 153-57 (1979) (rejecting the FTC’s conclusion and stating that “it is very 
wrong and paternalistic to refuse to take consumer demand as a given and to second-guess it by 
characterizing demand based on brand loyalty as ‘irrational’ or ‘imaginary’”); Yale Brozen, New FTC 
Policy from Obsolete Economic Doctrine, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 477, 477-78 (1972) (arguing that the FTC’s 
notions that “the cost of products to consumers is high because of advertising and that advertising 
is a barrier to entry behind whose shelter firms behave monopolistically . . . are both old and 
obsolete” and, furthermore, “discarded in economic analysis as erroneous—as inconsistent with 
economic theory and as unfounded”). 
346 Borden, Inc., 12 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,995 (Mar. 1, 1983); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 461 
U.S. 940 (1983); see also Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 18-20 (1996) (providing a full history of the ReaLemon case’s aftermath). 
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CONCLUSION 
More than a century of case law and repeated interventions by the 
Supreme Court have failed to produce a truly coherent theory of trademark 
functionality. The courts remain split in myriad ways, no less now than they 
were at the very beginning. The doctrine’s core formulation—prohibiting 
trademark protection for product features that affect cost or quality, or are 
essential to use or purpose—offers little help. The precedent can’t mean what 
it actually says, not without clashing against longstanding trademark 
principles and well-documented trademark phenomena. 
At the same time, the most challenging edge cases suggest a more accurate 
and holistic theory of trademark functionality, one based on fragility. Fragile 
functionalities—effects on cost, quality, use, or purpose that depend on 
exclusivity—are permitted and celebrated. Only non-fragile functionalities, 
which can be freely shared without dissipating, actually bar eligibility. 
Reorienting around the concept of fragility not only better explains real–
world case outcomes, but also unifies the treatment of marks and dress—and 
moots longstanding intercircuit disagreements. It suggests consistent 
answers, moreover, for some of the more divisive boundary issues in 
trademark law and policy today. 
A fragility test for functionality does appear to act as a generally welfare–
enhancing heuristic, comporting with the full history and purpose of the 
doctrine. But to be sure, permitting trademark protection for fragile 
functionalities will almost certainly lead to anticompetitive or regressive 
distributional effects in certain cases. As a matter of theory and practicability, 
the solutions to those problems likely need to be found in other fields of law—
and, though deeply controversial and complex, antitrust may be one such area 
for future work. 
 
